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IMPERFECT FINANCIAL MARKETS AND




The news has been filled with stories of meltdowns in the financial
world, with the government, independent agencies, and politicians all de-
voting significant time and energy to coping with the consequences. As in-
vestment banks, hedge funds, and mortgage lenders continue to suffer
massive losses, the government and its agents are left to try to pick up the
pieces. But what if, in addition to these more transparent problems, addi-
tional hidden costs from the financial crisis were being borne by the gov-
ernment in some other way? Even worse, what if the government had
implicitly underwritten some of them in the first place? Building on in-
sights from recent finance literature, this Article contends that the govern-
ment could in fact bear such hidden costs through the interaction of a
unique and underappreciated imperfection in the operation of public finan-
cial derivatives markets-the pricing of counterparty credit risk-and an
income tax on risky investments. Under relatively conservative assump-
tions, such an approach can produce a surprising result: the imposition of a
facially neutral income tax can actually serve to subsidize certain specula-
tors in financial derivatives, both in the model and as extrapolated to the
real world. In other words, an income tax in a world with imperfect finan-
cial markets can actually provide incentives to speculators to undertake ex-
cessively risky behavior, with the government ultimately bearing the cost.
These conclusions demonstrate the urgent need for a more comprehen-
sive approach to the taxation of financial derivative markets than has tradi-
tionally been undertaken, expanding the analysis beyond particular
transactions to incorporate markets, traders, speculators, and investors
more broadly. This Article does so by proposing the adoption of a deriva-
tives trading tax, not as a supplement to or replacement for, but rather as
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an integral part of, the income tax regime. Such a tax would not only offset
the costs of imperfect financial markets borne by the government through
the income tax, but could also ameliorate the suboptimal excess risk in the
financial markets in the first place. By redefining the terms of the debate in
this manner, a more efficient overall taxation regime can be crafted, while
maintaining the normative goals of an income tax.
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The Hidden Costs of a Modern Income Tax
"Wall Street got drunk ... and now it's got a hangover. The question is,
[h]ow long will it sober up [sic] and not try to do all these fancy financial
instruments?"
-President George W. Bush'
I. INTRODUCTION
HE news has been filled with stories of defaults and meltdowns in
the financial world with the government, independent agencies,
and politicians all devoting significant time and energy to coping
with the consequences. 2 As investment banks, hedge funds, insurance
companies, and mortgage lenders continue to suffer massive losses, the
government and its agents are left to try to pick up the pieces.3 But what
if, in addition to these more transparent problems, additional hidden
costs from the financial crisis were being borne by the government some
other way? Even worse, what if the government had implicitly under-
written some of them in the first place? Building on insights from recent
finance literature, this Article contends that the government can in fact
bear such hidden costs, through the previously unexplored interaction of
an income tax with the modern workings of imperfect financial markets.
It has long been understood that an income tax serves to place the
government in a form of partnership with taxpayers with respect to their
risky investments.4 What had been less clear for a number of years was
whether, and to what extent, taxpayers and the government could avoid
this result. Surprisingly, economic theory provides that, under a number
of assumptions, relatively simple changes by both taxpayers and the gov-
ernment can result in risky returns (such as bets on sporting events or
speculation on the price of oil) avoiding the impact of an income tax alto-
1. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, A Private, Blunter Bush Declares, 'Wall Street Got Drunk,'
N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2008, at A18.
2. These include the potential default or bankruptcy of some of what had previously
been perceived as the most credit-worthy counterparties in the world, such as investment
banks, mortgage brokers, collateralized debt pools, and credit insurers. See, e.g., Herb
Greenberg, General Growth's Indebtedness Raises Fears Among REIT Investors, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 19, 2008, at B3; Kate Kelly, Lost Opportunities Haunt Final Days of Bear Stearns,
WALL ST. J., May 27, 2008, at Al; Susan Pulliam & Serena Ng, Default Fears Unnerve
Markets: Partners in Credit Deals Face Big Write-Downs As Bond Insurer Teeters, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 18, 2008, at Al; Aparajita Saha-Bubna & Joseph Checkler, Fannie, Freddie Woes
Worse Than Bear's in Some Ways, WALL ST. J., July 14, 2008, at A13; Nick Timiraos, Be-
hind the U.S. Mortgage Mess, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 2007, at A7; Louise Story & Ben
White, The Road to Lehman's Failure Was Littered With Lost Chances, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6,
2008, at B1.
3. See, e.g., Doug Cameron, Hedge Funds Fear Backlash From Congress, WALL ST. J.,
June 25, 2008, at B5; Mark Gongloff, Driving Away Oil Speculators May Not Help, WALL
ST. J., June 24, 2008, at Cl; Ian Talley & Gregory Meyer, Oil Speculation Draws Scrutiny,
WALL ST. J., June 24, 2008, at A3.
4. This is because the government shares in the winnings of taxpayers by taxing them,
but also bears a share of the losses of taxpayers by allowing deductions which reduce taxes.
See, e.g., Christopher H. Hanna, Demystifying Tax Deferral, 52 SMU L. REV. 383, 388-89
(1999); David A. Weisbach, The (Non) Taxation of Risk, 58 TAX L. REV. 1, 3 (2004).
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gether.5 More specifically, the theory provides that taxpayers can effec-
tively nullify the impact of an income tax on their risky investments
simply by increasing the nominal amount of their investments, while the
government can sell its share back into the private market.6 The formal-
ized version of this, often referred to as the "taxation and risk" model,
has revolutionized the way income taxes have been analyzed.7
What has become increasingly clear in light of recent economic events,
however, is that modern financial markets have created new, unique, dif-
ficult to detect, and difficult to price risks that do not necessarily fit neatly
into this model - in other words, modern financial markets are imper-
fect. 8 This Article will focus on one such example: markets in financial
derivatives used to replicate investments in underlying assets. In their
most basic form, financial derivatives are nothing more than contracts
between two parties with respect to some reference, or stated more sim-
ply, financial derivatives are a form of bet between two parties. Just like
all bets, financial derivatives are valuable only if both the bet wins and
the losing party can pay.9 Although this risk of non-payment can theoret-
5. See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 4, at 1-2.
6. See id. For a detailed explanation of the taxation and risk model, see infra Part
III.A.
7. The taxation and risk literature has made an invaluable contribution to under-
standing the nature, incidence, and distributive impact of an income tax, and has served as
the foundation for the modern choice of tax base debate. See, e.g., Joseph Bankman &
David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax Over an Ideal Income
Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1415-16 (2006). Proponents of replacing the income tax with a
consumption tax contend that this model establishes that an income tax is both ineffective
in raising necessary revenue and inefficient in trying to tax returns on capital investment.
See generally David A. Weisbach, The Case for a Consumption Tax, 110 TAX NOTES 1357
(2006). Proponents of the income tax counter that abandoning an income tax could violate
norms of distributive justice inherent in an income tax, under the theory that those with
little to no capital investments-mostly working poor-would be forced to bear a greater
proportion of the total tax burden. See, e.g., Martin J. McMahon Jr., An Income Tax Is
Superior to a Wage or Consumption Tax, 110 TAX NOTES 1353, 1353 (2006); Lawrence
Zelenak, The Sometimes-Taxation of the Returns to Risk-Bearing Under a Progressive In-
come Tax, 59 SMU L. REV. 879, 893-94 (2006). Regardless, due to the results of this
model, the debate over income versus consumption tax has primarily focused on the taxa-
tion of risk. See Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Is the Debate Between and Income
Tax and a Consumption Tax a Debate About Risk? Does it Matter?, 47 TAX L. REV. 377,
378 (1992).
8. See, e.g., P. Jean-Jacques Herings & Karl Schmedders, Computing Equilibria in
Finance Economies with Incomplete Markets and Transaction Costs, 27 ECON. THEORY 493,
494 (2006); INT'L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: DEVELOP-
MENTS AND PRACTICES 45-58 (Sept. 2004), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/
GFSR/2004/02/pdf/gfsrO9O4.pdf [hereinafter IMF HEDGE FUND REPORT]; SEC STAFF
REP., IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH OF HEDGE FUNDS 64 (Sept. 2003), available at http://
www.sec.gov/news/studies/hedgefunds0903.pdf [hereinafter SEC HEDGE FUND REPORT].
See also PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP ON FIN. MKTS., HEDGE FUNDS, LEVERAGE, AND
THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 15 (1999), available at http://www.us
treas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP
REPORT].
9. This concept has been explored in other contexts. See generally Lynn A. Stout,
Betting the Bank: How Derivatives Trading Under Conditions of Uncertainty Can Increase
Risks and Erode Returns in Financial Markets, 21 J. CORP. L. 53 (1995). In effect, by
"decoupling" economic exposure to an asset from actual ownership, derivatives introduce
unique risks and considerations into the analysis, including that sophisticated financial in-
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ically be priced into the derivative, recent finance literature has deter-
mined that this risk of default can, and likely has, become a structural
component of liquid derivatives markets, which can be neither fully
priced nor diversified away by investors.
The primary contribution of this Article will be to incorporate this les-
son into the taxation and risk model, uncovering implicit costs in the in-
come taxation of derivatives so that such costs can be taken into account
in designing a more equitable and efficient tax regime.10 Under this ap-
proach, since the government can be thought of as sharing in all the risky
investments of taxpayers through the income tax, the imposition of even
a facially neutral income tax can mean that the government also indi-
rectly bears a portion of the unpriced default risk in the liquid derivatives
markets. As a result, speculators in risk benefit from an incremental pos-
itive risk-adjusted net present value in such investments, creating incen-
tives to invest in risky investments beyond optimal levels. In addition,
and perhaps even more troubling, the income tax itself could be thought
of as creating incentives to taxpayers to increase investments in deriva-
tives as a means to avoid the income tax, exacerbating this effect.
Taken together, these consequences could lead to a form of downward
spiral: as demand for derivatives increased due to the income tax, the
need for supply of derivatives would increase as well, bringing riskier
counterparties into the market, increasing the amount of default risk in
the market as a whole, furthering the amount of such risk indirectly as-
sumed by the government through the income tax as well. In other
words, through the imposition of even a facially neutral income tax in a
world with imperfect financial markets, the government could be thought
of as "subsidizing" financial speculators, both by creating demand for de-
rivatives by investors ex ante and bearing a portion of the default risk of
speculators ex post.
In response, this Article will introduce a new, more comprehensive ap-
proach to the taxation of financial derivative markets,"' expanding the
analysis to incorporate markets, traders, speculators, and investors more
broadly, by proposing the adoption of a derivatives trading tax, not as a
vestors such as hedge funds have become experts in exploiting the opportunities presented
by decoupling in the modern financial markets. See Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, The
New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CAL. L. REV.
811 (2006) (hereinafter Decoupling I).
10. The literature has lamented that more has not been done with the taxation and
risk model. See Weisbach, supra note 4, at 3-4 ("The taxation and risk literature and the
conclusions that follow from it, however, do not appear to have been widely accepted....
Because there has been no article or commentary arguing that the literature is flawed, one
is left to imagine the reasons why it has not been accepted.").
11. The traditional legal approach to the taxation of financial derivatives-targeting
specific financial transactions on a case-by-case basis-has proven less than effective in
broadly defending the income tax base against the engineering of the modern financial
markets. See, e.g., Michael S. Knoll, Financial Innovation, Tax Arbitrage, and Retrospective
Taxation: The Problem With Passive Government Lending, 52 TAX L. REV. 199, 199-200
(1997); Alex Raskolnikov, Relational Tax Planning Under Risk-Based Rules, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 1181, 1183 (2008).
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supplement or replacement for, but rather as an integral part of, the in-
come taxation of financial derivatives. Under this analysis, the need for
and structure of a derivative trading tax would derive from the lessons
learned by introducing derivatives into the taxation and risk model,
rather than from exogenous concerns with the functioning of the markets
or as an independent means to raise revenue.' 2 Although not part of the
income tax base, the derivative trading tax would be intended to partially
offset the distortions caused by the government bearing default risk
through the income tax, and thus would be part of crafting a more com-
prehensive income tax regime. By redefining the terms of the debate in
this manner, a more efficient overall taxation regime can be crafted, while
maintaining the normative goals of an income tax.
Part II of this Article will begin by describing and analyzing recent in-
sights from the finance literature on the structure of modern financial
derivatives markets, identifying liquidity-based default risk as a recent
and unique risk which can neither be fully priced nor diversified away by
investors. Part III will then, for the first time, introduce this new un-
priced risk into the taxation and risk model to analyze the impact on the
incidence and distribution of an income tax, concluding that even a
facially neutral income tax can serve to subsidize financial speculators.
Part IV will extrapolate the conclusions from the model, demonstrating
that even under certain restrictions of the real world, both investors in
derivatives and taxpayers more generally can effectively subsidize such
speculators through the income tax. Part V will then utilize this insight to
frame some of the normative implications, first as to speculators specifi-
cally, and then to the taxation of modem financial markets more gener-
ally, demonstrating how this approach can alter the agenda regarding the
proper structure of an income tax in a world with imperfect financial
markets.
II. MODERN FINANCIAL MARKETS,
DERIVATIVES, AND RISK
An analysis of the taxation of financial derivatives must begin with the
economics of financial derivatives and the markets upon which they
12. This exercise is a legal undertaking, notwithstanding that it requires delving into
the detailed mechanics of financial markets and derivatives, because crafting the institu-
tions and mechanisms necessary to implement a fair, efficient, and effective income tax is
itself a legal undertaking. See generally Michael A. Livingston, Reinventing Tax Scholar-
ship: Lawyers, Economists, and the Role of the Legal Academy, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 365
(1998); Marin Roger Scordato, Reflections on the Nature of Legal Scholarship in the Post-
Realist Era, 48 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 353 (2008); William J. Turnier, Tax (And Lots of
Other) Scholars Need Not Apply: The Changing Venue for Scholarship, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC.
189, 190 (2000). Such an approach has proven successful in other areas of the law. See, e.g.,
Richard A. Booth, Discounts and Other Mysteries of Corporate Finance, 79 CAL. L. REV.
1053, 1056 (1991); Henry T. C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate In-
vestment, 38 UCLA L. REV. 277, 279-80 (1990); Lynn A. Stout, How Efficient Markets
Undervalue Stocks: CAPM and ECMH Under Conditions of Uncertainty and Disagreement,
19 CARDOZO L. REV. 475, 478-80 (1997).
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trade. Specifically, it is necessary to understand the crucial role that spec-
ulators play in such markets and the risks they create before such costs
can be introduced into the taxation and risk model. What can be discov-
ered is that the unique combination of the business model of modern
financial speculators and the mechanics of modern derivative markets can
lead to unpriced default risk being imposed on the market.13 Such risk is
recent, significant, and difficult to measure, and has fundamentally re-
shaped the allocation of risk in the financial markets.
That speculators introduce this risk into the derivatives markets does
not necessarily mean that such risk is undesirable or that regulation is
necessary; it is possible that markets willingly take on such risk in ex-
change for liquidity, while it is also possible that regulation could increase
the transparency of such risks. 14 Regardless of any regulatory response,
however, what is important to the income tax analysis is that a unique
and difficult to measure risk has been introduced into the modern finan-
cial marketplace that cannot be completely eliminated through regula-
tion, pricing, or arbitrage. By examining and understanding such risk, it
can then be introduced into the taxation and risk model so as to identify
any resulting distortions to the income tax base and thus craft the proper
normative and prescriptive responses.
A. FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES, RISK, AND DECOUPLING
Financial derivatives are unique assets in many respects; in particular,
financial derivatives permit willing counterparties to bet on a risky asset
without investing capital in the asset itself precisely because, in their sim-
plest form, financial derivatives are nothing more than executory con-
tracts between two parties based on the value of some reference. 15 The
name "derivative" indicates its fundamental nature, that is, the contract
has no inherent financial value but rather derives its value from the un-
derlying reference.1 6 Stated more simply, two parties bet on the future
13. Ben Bernanke, Chairman of the Federal Reserve, stated in a recent speech:
Much of the recent debate . . . has focused on the opacity of hedge funds to
regulatory authorities and to the markets generally, which is viewed by some
as an important source of liquidity risk. Liquidity in a particular market seg-
ment might well decline sharply and unexpectedly if hedge funds chose or
were forced to reduce a large exposure in that segment.
Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors, Fed. Reserve Sys., Speech at the Fed. Re-
serve Bank of Atlanta's 2006 Financial Markets Conference (May 16, 2006), available at
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Bernanke2006O516a.htm.
14. See, e.g., Troy A. Paredes, On the Decision to Regulate Hedge Funds: The SEC's
Regulatory Philosophy, Style, and Mission, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 975.
15. See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational
Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102'YALE L.J. 1457, 1464-65 (1993);
Peter H. Huang, A Normative Analysis of New Financially Engineered Derivatives, 73 S.
CAL. L. REV. 471, 483-84 (2003); Kimberly D. Krawiec, More Than Just "New Financial
Bingo": A Risk-Based Approach to Understanding Derivatives, 23 IOWA J. CORP. L. 1, 46
(1997).
16. See Huang, supra note 15, at 483. The classic example is a stock option, which is
the right (but not the obligation) to purchase a share of stock in the future at a set price - if
the stock increases in value the option is valuable while if the stock decreases in value it is
2009]
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price of an asset. Since derivatives always involve a bet, they also require
two parties, each willing to accept offsetting risks. 17 What is not required,
however, is the underlying asset itself.' 8 For this reason, it is possible for
the amount of money at risk in the derivatives markets to exceed the
entire value of all financial assets in the world.19
Due to this unique feature of derivatives, investment in an asset can be
"decoupled" from ownership of the underlying asset itself.20 It has re-
cently been demonstrated that derivatives can significantly change the
understanding of voting rights and influence on public corporations due
to this decoupling phenomenon. 21 This Article will focus on a different
variation of the decoupling problem - that by investing in a derivative an
investor need not own the underlying asset, but in exchange must accept
a new and unique risk: the risk that the counterparty may default. This
could be thought of as a form of "risk decoupling" in that it is precisely
the decoupling of the economic investment in an asset from actual owner-
ship of that asset which introduces counterparty default risk into the
discussion.
More specifically, financial derivatives permit willing counterparties to
replace upfront capital investments with contingent liabilities.22 In other
words, each side promises to pay the other if they lose the bet, but neither
of the parties knows at the time of the execution of the derivative
whether they will be the winner or loser (that is, whether the derivative
will ultimately be an asset or liability in their hands). Whether the deriva-
tive is an asset or liability depends on the movement in price of the un-
not. See id. Options are not the only type of financial derivative. For example, a forward
contract is a bilateral executory contract to purchase a share of stock in the future at a
fixed price that is mandatory for both parties, while a futures contract is a type of forward
contract traded on a regulated exchange. A notional principal contract (NPC) is an execu-
tory contract to make payments between the parties as if they had invested a notional
amount in an underlying asset. See, e.g., Ren6 M. Stulz, Should We Fear Derivatives?, 18 J.
ECON. PERSP. 173, 174-76 (2004). The classic NPC is the interest rate swap. Id.
17. See David M. Schizer, Balance in the Taxation of Derivative Securities: An Agenda
for Reform, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1886, 1904 (2004) ("To enter into a derivative, the princi-
pal requirement is a willing counterparty. A long needs to find a short, and vice versa.").
18. See Stout, supra note 9, at 66 ("Derivatives transactions by definition do not in-
volve the purchase of an underlying asset, but rather amount to side bets on the movement
of some rate, price, or index.").
19. See Jacob Leibenluft, $596 Trillion!: How Can the Derivatives Market Be Worth
More Than the World's Total Financial Assets?, SLATE, Oct. 15, 2008, http://www.slate.com/
id/2202263.
20. See Decoupling I, supra note 9.
21. See, e.g., Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and
Empty Voting II: Importance and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625 (2008) (hereinafter
Decoupling II); Decoupling I, supra note 9.
22. See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 17, at 1902 ("The key point is that the parties to a
standard [derivative] do not part with the use of any money upon entering into the con-
tract-whether they are long or short-and thus do not earn a return for time value.").
Alternatively, a counterparty could require an upfront deposit, in which case the derivative
would be "prepaid" with an upfront capital investment. Since these deposits serve more in
the nature of security than capital investment, the only difference is the time value of the
deposit during the life of the derivative. Solely for these purposes, therefore, it is sufficient
to treat prepaid derivatives the same as non-prepaid derivatives.
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derlying asset, which can change over the life of the derivative contract
depending on the volatility of the underlying asset. In effect, all financial
derivatives have "embedded" leverage; the only issue is the directionality
of the net liability at any given time given the price of the underlying
asset.
23
It is for this reason that derivatives permit an easy way to generate
leveraged returns on investments in risk. 24 This benefit is not free, how-
ever. Rather, the investor must take on the default risk exposure of a
counterparty if, but only if, the investor wins the risky bet in the deriva-
tive contract (or they would be the "creditor" in the embedded debt of
the counterparty).2 5 In other words, every derivative investor bears con-
tingent default risk. 26
Why do investors in derivatives agree to bear this default risk in the
first place? If there were no other way to make such an investment, in-
vesting in a derivative might make sense notwithstanding this new risk
component. Under financial theory, however, derivatives are "redun-
dant" instruments, meaning there is no net investment that can be made
with a derivative that could not be made through some combination of
the underlying financial assets themselves. 27 Thus, there would be no
need for derivatives to exist if engaging in the underlying transactions was
possible at the same cost as entering into the derivative. Rather, deriva-
tives exist because they permit investors to gain exposure to such invest-
23. A derivative contract is similar to each counterparty borrowing funds from the
other to invest in the underlying asset, in opposite directions. This phenomenon can be
demonstrated by an application of the well-know "put-call parity" theorem. Under put-
call parity, an investment in a risky asset can be identically replicated through a combina-
tion of a put on the risky investment, a call on the risky investment, and debt. Put-call
parity provides that for any risky investment S, holding S plus a put on S (that is, the right
to sell S at a fixed price) is equivalent to holding debt plus a call on S (that is, the right to
buy S at a fixed price), so long as the "strike" price of the put and call are both the current
price of S and the debt is that of the issuer of S. In formulaic terms, S + P = D + C. See,
e.g., Michael S. Knoll, Put-Call Parity and the Law, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 61, 64-74 (2002).
Applying simple algebra, a call option is equal to borrowing to buy stock and a put (C = S
+ P - D), while holding a call and writing a put is identical to borrowing to buy stock (C - P
= S - D). So for any non-optional derivative E, which is identical to holding a call and
writing a put, the formula would be E = S - D. In other words, holding a long derivative is
identical to borrowing to buy stock, while holding a short derivative is the same as shorting
stock and using the proceeds to buy debt. See id. This example oversimplifies the analysis,
but is a useful illustration of the embedded debt in a derivative.
24. See, e.g., Frank Partnoy, Financial Derivatives and the Costs of Regulatory Arbi-
trage, 22 J. CORP. L. 211, 217 (1997).
25. See, e.g., Darrell Duffie & Ming Huang, Swap Rates and Credit Quality, 51 J. FIN.
921, 921-22 (1996); Hu, supra note 15, at 1468; Keith Sill, The Economic Benefits and Risks
of Derivative Securities, FED. RESERVE BANK OF PHILA. Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 1997, at 15
(1997), available at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/files/br/brjf97ks.pdf.
26. See, e.g., Ian A. Cooper & Antonio S. Mello, The Default Risk of Swaps, 46 J. FIN.
597, 598 (1991); Hu, supra note 15, at 1468.
27. For example, a call option on a share of stock has the same cash flows as if an
investor borrowed cash to acquire the stock at the strike price on a nonrecourse basis. See,
e.g., Knoll, supra note 23, at 79-80; see also SALIN N. NEFrCI, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
MATHEMATICS OF FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES (2d ed. 2000).
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ments at substantially reduced transaction costs. 28 To the extent that
bearing default risk in the derivative is cheaper than the transaction costs
of investing in the comparable underlying assets, it could make sense for
an investor to use a derivative to invest in a particular asset rather than
buying the asset itself. This makes the pricing of default risk crucially
important in such a decision.
B. THE UNEASY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PRICE AND DEFAULT
RISK IN FINANCIAL DERIVATIVES
To be able to accurately price the default risk of a counterparty into a
derivative contract, an investor must know the investment profile of the
counterparty to the derivative contracts, since different investors enter
into derivatives for different reasons: some attempt to hedge risk expo-
sure, others try to maximize risky bets, and still others purely gamble on
the future. The underlying reason for a counterparty to enter into the
derivative informs the default risk of such counterparty as well - the
more speculative the counterparty, the greater the default risk. 29
The classic counterparty to a derivative is the hedging investor.30 For
example, a firm may issue floating rate interest debt but prefer fixed rate
risk exposure3' because of low cash flows in the short term which could
cause the firm to default on its interest payments.32 Firms with substan-
tial equity value will have a strong incentive to hedge in this manner,33 so
as to protect against risks that could impact their total return, which are
28. See, e.g., Sill supra, note 25, at 15. For example, it would be much simpler to enter
into a single interest rate swap than to sell floating rate debt instruments short to finance
the purchase of fixed rate debt instruments. See James Bicksler & Andrew H. Chen, An
Economic Analysis of Interest Rate Swaps, 41 J. FIN. 645, 651 (1986). To utilize underlying
assets, it would be necessary to find two issuers to engage in two different transactions each
time the swap payment is to be made. In effect, the swap acts as a series of forward con-
tracts on the underlying interest rate. See, e.g., Robert H. Litzenberger, Swaps: Plain and
Fancifid, 47 J. FIN. 831, 833 (1992).
29. See, e.g., Robert A. Jarrow & Stuart M. Turnbull, Pricing Derivatives on Financial
Securities Subject to Credit Risk, 50 J. FIN. 53, 53-54 (1995).
30. The hedging investor seeks to offset a sub-optimal risk position through entering
into an offsetting derivative position. See Stout, supra note 9, at 55.
31. This could occur, for example, because the floating rate market is the most liquid
debt market, because it has lower transaction costs than fixed rate debt, or because of
market failures that allow arbitrage pricing between the fixed and floating rate debt mar-
kets. See Bicksler & Chen, supra note 28, at 651.
32. Such a firm could prefer a fixed rate of interest due to the differing variance of the
two risk portfolios. See Stout, supra note 9, at 55 ("Although the futures purchase would
not increase the ... net earnings, it would reduce the variation in those earnings by offset-
ting a pre-existing business risk with a carefully selected, counterbalancing derivatives
risk."). This can be true notwithstanding the fact that the risk-adjusted present values of
the loans are equal. See Christopher Geczy et al., Why Firms Use Currency Derivatives, 52
J. FIN. 1323, 1330 (1997).
33. More specifically, assuming that equity holders of a firm with risky debt have a
payout function similar to that of an option on the assets of the firm, the incentive to
increase the variance of the cash flows of the firm (and thus increase the risks of bank-
ruptcy costs) depends on the relative elasticity of the price movement of the option to the
volatility of the price of assets, or the "vega" of the option. If the option is at or in the
money, as would be the case where there is significant equity value in excess of risky debt,
the vega on the option is low, and thus equity holders have low incentives to increase cash
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independent of, and unrelated to, the success of the underlying busi-
ness.34 In addition to hedging investors, however, two types of specula-
tive investors may act as counterparties: (1) rational speculators, or those
whose business model permits taking on certain amounts of speculative
risk; and (2) pure risk seekers, or gamblers who make uncovered bets on
risk.3 5
A hedging counterparty to a derivative contract will be the least likely
to default on the contract, since the derivative will be covered by the
hedge. The rational speculator is more likely to default on an obligation
than the hedging investor, since the obligation to pay would be supported
not by a hedge but only by the other assets of the business. The pure
gambler is the most likely to default on the obligation under the deriva-
tive contract, since the gambler would only be able to satisfy a losing bet
out of other unrelated proceeds. Absent information as to the identity of
the counterparty, an investor could enter into otherwise apparently iden-
tical derivative contracts but bear different levels of default risk.36
In an efficient market, this differential risk profile would be known to
the investor and priced into the terms of the derivative contract itself.3 7
The problem with the derivatives market is that it is not wholly efficient;
rather, derivatives markets exist precisely due to the presence of market
flow variance. See Abon Mozumdar, Corporate Hedging and Speculative Incentives: Impli-
cations for Swap Market Default Risk, 36 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 221, 229-30 (2001).
34. In effect, this could be thought of as a form of equity insurance. This hedging
incentive does not hold indefinitely, however. If the total value of the equity exposure risk
is smaller than the potential reward over time, then it may not be worth it to the equity
holders to insure against unrelated risks. In other words, they can make a "free" bet on
the unrelated risk. See Mozumdar, supra note 33, at 229-30. This incentive structure only
increases as the residual equity grows smaller, until it is maximized when the residual eq-
uity is zero; in such case, equity holders would have no incentive to hedge. See id.
35. See Stout, supra note 9, at 55-57. The latter is easier to observe. Assume a firm
with no assets believes that the price of gold will increase over the next year and that the
market has not properly priced this increase. This firm wants to invest long in gold, but
since it has no assets it cannot purchase gold. The firm could, however, enter into a deriva-
tive long gold without any up-front cash investment. If the firm is correct and the price of
gold increases, the firm will make money. If the firm is incorrect and the price of gold
drops, however, it will owe a liability under the derivative. It must either satisfy this liabil-
ity out of other assets unrelated to the gold risk exposure, or it must default on this liabil-
ity. This is the inherent aspect of "pure bet" speculation, i.e., that the bet is at most
covered by unrelated assets, on the hope that the bet will win.
36. See Jarrow & Turnbull, supra note 29, at 53.
37. Determining the price of an option is complicated and generally was not mathe-
matically possible prior to the advent of the Black-Scholes option pricing model in 1973.
The Black-Scholes model determines the price of an option as a function of a combination
of underlying factors that impact the price of the option, including the price of the underly-
ing asset, the volatility of the underlying asset, the strike price of the option, the time to
exercise, and other factors. See generally Fischer Black & Myron Scholes, The Pricing of
Options and Corporate Liabilities, 81 J. POL. ECON. 637 (1973). The precision of the Black-
Scholes model has been questioned, especially the assumption regarding underlying vola-
tilities, but the fundamental concept has remained the primary method of valuing deriva-
tive contracts since its introduction. See generally NEFrci, supra note 27; see also Gurdip
Bakshi, Charles Cao & Zhiwu Chen, Do Call Prices and the Underlying Stock Always
Move in the Same Direction?, 13 REV. FIN. STUD. 549 (2000). For purposes of this discus-




inefficiencies (such as transaction costs) in the trading of the underlying
asset, which the derivatives serve to mitigate. 38 There is a tension, there-
fore, between the transaction cost minimization function and the infor-
mation asymmetry problem 39 of derivatives: to learn the investment
profile of a counterparty on a case-by-case basis, a potential investor
would need to expend significant transaction costs, 40 while entering into a
derivative without such diligence would makes it more difficult to ascer-
tain the default risk of the counterparty. In other words, in exchange for
reduced transaction costs, investors in derivatives must bear, to some ex-
tent, the default risk of the counterparty. 41 As a result, the lower the
transaction costs of a derivatives market, the greater the chance of enter-
ing into a derivative with a speculator and bearing unpriced counterparty
default risk. 42
C. THE RISE OF MODERN FINANCIAL SPECULATORS: How DEFAULT
RISK WAS POOLED AND MAGNIFIED ON
LIQUID DERIVATIVE MARKETS
Since the extent to which investors bear unpriced default risk turns on
the transaction costs of the market, it follows that investors trading on
markets with the lowest transaction costs are most likely to bear unpriced
default risk, especially as more speculators trade on that market. Since
(as discussed below) liquid markets tend to have the lowest transaction
costs, the next question is-to what extent do speculators trade on such
38. See, e.g., Sill, supra note 25, at 24 ("In [theory], the presence or absence of deriva-
tives has no implications for the riskiness of financial markets or the volatility of underly-
ing assets. In reality, financial markets are not complete and there are frictions, so the
presence or absence of derivatives matters for the economy.").
39. Some contend that derivatives reduce information asymmetries by serving as a
signal to the market of risk assessments of the underlying asset and thus serve an informa-
tional purpose (both in the trading of the derivative itself and in the incentives it provides
to increase information gathering regarding the underlying asset). Due primarily to the
role of speculators, however, the derivative market is not necessarily a signal for true de-
mand for the underlying asset. See H. Henry Cao, The Effect of Derivative Assets on Infor-
mation Acquisition and Price Behavior in a Rational Expectations Equilibrium, 12 REV.
FIN. STUD. 131, 136 (1999); Massimo Massa, Financial Innovation and Information: The
Role of Derivatives When a Market for Information Exists, 15 REV. FIN. STUD. 927, 927
(2002). Except with respect to certain "cash and carry" markets, it is unlikely that deriva-
tive trading consists more of information arbitrage than speculation. See supra note 28 and
accompanying text.
40. A party could privately negotiate a derivative contract by either seeking out the
optimal risk minimizing counterparty or discovering sufficient information to price default
risk into the derivative contract on a case-by-case basis. Either option would require ex-
tensive information gathering and other transaction costs, likely making the derivative pro-
hibitive, since at some point the party could hedge through the underlying assets for similar
costs.
41. Edward S. Adams & David E. Runkle, The Easy Case for Derivatives Use: Advo-
cating a Corporate Fiduciary Duty to Use Derivatives, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 595, 663
(2000) ("Credit risk is the risk that a counterparty will not have sufficient resources to meet
the obligations contained in the contract and thus will default. Managing ... credit risk can
be difficult because the extent of exposure can change rapidly." (internal quotations
omitted)).
42. See Sill, supra note 25, at 24.
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markets? The answer turns out to be that modern liquid markets neces-
sarily involve highly speculative counterparties, such as hedge funds and
investment banks, which pool and magnify default risk across the entire
market.
Liquid derivatives markets are those which permit the ready buying
and selling of financial derivatives without the need to identify a particu-
lar counterparty. Liquidity is highly valued because it significantly
reduces transaction costs by permitting investment in a derivative without
needing to identify any particular counterparty. 43 To provide liquidity,
the markets must offer both fungible derivative contracts, such that an
investor is indifferent as to any particular contract, and a sufficient supply
of fungible derivative contracts, so that all orders can be filled on de-
mand.44 In general, it is unlikely if not impossible that there could be
sufficient hedging investors to create a liquid market; as a result, specula-
tors are necessary to provide liquidity.45 The problem is that (as dis-
cussed in more detail in Part IV) many speculators are excluded from
access to liquid derivative markets due to their excessive default risk.
This tension-the need for liquidity trading on a derivatives market, but
the unease over the presence of speculators-creates demand for pure
"liquidity providers" in the market.
Liquidity providers act as speculators in the derivatives market, not to
invest in the underlying risks themselves (unlike gambling speculators),
but rather to provide liquidity to the market in the form of acting as a
willing counterparty to risk.4 6 These investors do not invest in derivatives
to speculate in the price of a particular asset, but rather agree to enter
into derivatives solely to make a profit by providing liquidity to the mar-
ket.47 Since liquidity providers do not seek to be exposed to a risky posi-
tion but rather act as willing counterparties to risk in the liquid
derivatives market, liquidity providers constantly search for offsetting po-
sitions.48 These offsetting positions often, if not primarily, involve invest-
ments in illiquid securities or derivatives with respect to illiquid
securities. 4
9
43. Derivatives traded on a liquid market can trade at a premium to those privately
negotiated. See, e.g., Menachem Brenner et al., The Price of Options Illiquidity, 56 J. FIN.
789, 803 (2001) (finding a 21% discount for nontradeable currency options that could not
be arbitraged away).
44. Fungibility and liquidity permit willing buyers and sellers to be matched on an as-
needed basis without any particular investor being required to expend the high transac-
tions costs of investigating or negotiating the terms of a particular derivative investment.
See Krawiec, supra note 15, at 45-46.
45. See id. at 15 n.65 ("Speculators are needed ... to provide liquidity to the deriva-
tives market."); see also Michael R. Powers et al., Market Bubbles and Wasteful Avoidance:
Tax and Regulatory Constraints on Short Sales, 57 TAX L. REV. 233, 237 (2004).
46. See Myron S. Scholes, Crisis and Risk Management, 90 AM. EcoN. REV. 17, 18-19
(2000).
47. See, e.g., Linda M. Beale, Book-Tax Conformity and the Corporate Tax Shelter De-
bate: Assessing the Proposed Section 475 Mark-To-Market Safe Harbor, 24 VA. TAx REv.
301, 390-91 (2004).




As demand for liquidity providers by financial markets grew, a near-
defunct industry in so-called "hedge funds" began looking for ways to
broaden its investment base and increase its appeal to investment capi-
tal.50 At the same time, modern financial theory was generating for-
mulaic measurements of risk allocation, building on the groundbreaking
work of the Black-Scholes option pricing model. In particular, these
"quants" 51 were able to deconstruct investment returns into component
risks and to price these independently through the use of derivative pric-
ing formulas. By doing so, finance theory promised to be able to create
pure profit generators by focusing on sectors of the market that were
underserved, but for which systemic and/or idiosyncratic risk could be
mathematically eliminated. 52
The combination proved a type of "perfect storm" of financial invest-
ment: as derivatives markets demanded liquidity, investors sought, profit
generators, and financial theorists created models that theoretically could
isolate pure risk bets through liquidity provision. The combination
helped spur the rise of modern financial speculation through alternative
investment funds.53 Investors would agree to provide capital, and the
funds would agree to provide access to their financial models, in ex-
change for a share of the profits. 54
What resulted was a class of modern speculators, including hedge funds
and certain insurance companies and investment banks, arising to serve
primarily as liquidity providers to the financial derivatives markets. 55 By
50. See Sargon Daniel, Note, Hedge Fund Registration: Yesterday's Regulatory
Schemes for Today's Investment Vehicles, 2007 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 247, 253-54; Jonathan
J. Katz, Barbarians at the Ballot Box: The Use of Hedging to Acquire Low Cost Corporate
Influence and Its Effects on Shareholder Apathy, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1483, 1493 (2006).
It is generally agreed that the first hedge fund was founded in 1949 by A. W. Jones. See,
e.g., William Fung & David A. Hsieh, A Primer on Hedge Funds, 6 J. EMPIRICAL FIN. 309,
310 (1999).
51. See RICHARD R. LINDSEY & BARRY SCHACHTER, How I BECAME A QUANT: IN-
SIGHTS FROM 25 OF WALL STREET'S ELITE 1-2 (2007) ("'A quant designs and implements
mathematical models for the pricing of derivatives, assessment of risk, or predicting market
movements.' .. . The key ingredient that ties quants to derivatives and the other two func-
tions identified by Joshi ... is mathematical know-how." (internal footnote omitted)).
52. In particular, one of these types of models proposed that liquidity risk could be
isolated from other types of investment risk (including default risk, legal risk, systemic risk,
etc.) through the use of dynamic, or "delta," hedging techniques. For a detailed discussion
of delta hedging, see Eric D. Chason, Naked and Covered in Monte Carlo: A Reappraisal of
Option Taxation, 27 VA. TAX REV. 135, 146-49 (2007).
53. These alpha generator funds employed quants to write financial models pursuant
to which the funds could create positive returns by providing liquidity to the financial mar-
kets without exposure to the underlying risk of the reference assets (which themselves had
systemic risk). See supra note 51.
54. As these profits grew tremendously, other more traditional financial institutions,
such as investment banks, began getting into the business of providing liquidity to financial
markets as well, at times with tragic results. Most did so by either forming their own inter-
nal hedge funds or contracting through hedge funds, which themselves went bankrupt in
the credit crunch. See, e.g., Gretchen Morgenson, Bear Stearns Says Battered Hedge Funds
Are Worth Little, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2007, at C2; Landon Thomas, Jr., Funds Try to Lose
Ties to Lehman, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008, at Cl.
55. See, e.g., Vikas Agarwal et al, Liquidity Provision in the Convertible Bond Market:
Analysis of Convertible Arbitrage Hedge Funds (2007), http://accounting.uwaterloo.ca/fi-
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attempting to generate profit by taking on liquidity risk through applica-
tion of their modem financial models,56 these speculators pooled and
magnified their default risk into single large counterparties. In so doing,
for the first time a new, distinct, and unique form of risk was introduced
into the financial markets-the risk that the liquidity providers might
mismanage their own liquidity and thus default on their obligations to the
market. This risk was then introduced into the financial markets them-
selves, since liquidity provider speculators had become indispensable to
the functioning of liquid derivatives markets.
As a result, investors in the liquid derivatives market were no longer
subject to the same default risk as if they had entered into a derivative
with an individual counterparty, that is the risk that the particular
counterparty might not have sufficient assets to pay. Rather, the risk in a
market with liquidity providers is that an unforeseen shock in any one
liquidity provider's illiquid positions will result in holding illiquid assets
as a hedge against highly liquid derivatives, with the inability to liquidate
these investments, particularly during times of economic stress.57 In
other words, liquidity providers provide liquidity to the market, but con-
sequently impose default risk on the market.58
nance/casf/documentsYeeChengLoonFeb2007.pdf; see also Fung & Hsieh, supra note 50,
at 309-10.
56. See Steven M. Davidoff, Black Market Capital, 2008 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 172,
196.
57. See Antulio N. Bomfim, Counterparty Credit Risk in Interest Rate Swaps During
Times of Market Stress (Fed. Res. Bd. Fin. & Econ. Discussion Series No. 2003-9, 2003),
available at https://www.federalreserve.gov/pubsFEDS/2003/200309/200309pap.pdf;
Scholes, supra note 46, at 17 ("As a result of the financial crisis, LTCM was forced to
switch from being a large supplier to being a large demander of liquidity .. "). For an
empirical study of the effects of liquidity on corporate bond prices, see generally Francis A.
Longstaff, Sanjay Mithal, & Eric Neis, Corporate Yield Spreads: Default Risk or Liquidity?
New Evidence from the Credit Default Swap Market, 40 J. FIN. 2213 (2005) (finding that the
credit derivative market absorbed most of the liquidity risk in corporate bonds, leaving the
corporate bond market primarily sensitive to credit risk except in extreme liquidity cases).
58. See, e.g., Carsten Murawski & Rajna Gibson, Default Risk Mitigation in Deriva-
tives Markets and its Effectiveness (EFA 2006 Zurich Meetings Paper 2006), available at
http://ssrn.comlabstract=906488. If liquidity providers linearly hedged their derivative in-
vestments, there would be no benefit to providing liquidity, unless there were arbitrage
opportunities or substantial informational asymmetries that the liquidity provider utilized
to extract rents from the market. This is not generally the case, however. Rather, liquidity
providers "dynamically" hedge their derivative exposure. Dynamic, or "delta," hedging is
a means of fully hedging the exposure on a non-linear derivative instrument by combining
borrowing and investments in the underlying asset to minimize the exposure to changes in
the price of the underlying asset (this risk to exposure in the change of the underlying asset
is referred to as "delta"). See, e.g., Chason, supra note 52, at 146-49. The problem with
delta hedging is that it must be "dynamic"-meaning that the amount of borrowing and
investment must be adjusted every time the price of the underlying asset changes. See id.
Since the ability to accurately measure delta and accurately trade debt and assets to mini-
mize delta is limited due to transaction costs, liquidity, and modeling error, dynamic hedg-
ing errors may accumulate over time and potentially become significant; in such case, an
investor could think they were fully hedged but in reality bear substantial risk. See, e.g., T.
Clifton Green & Stephen Figlewski, Market Risk and Model Risk for a Financial Institution
Writing Options, 54 J. FIN. 1465, 1467 (1999); see also Henrik J. Neuhaus, A Portfolio Ap-




D. FINANCIAL MARKET RESPONSE: THE RISE OF
UNPRICED DEFAULT RISK
As discussed above, to maintain fungibility, liquid markets do not iden-
tify counterparty-specific information. As a result, there is no way for an
investor to know whether a particular counterparty is a hedging investor,
speculator, or liquidity provider, and thus, no way to either seek out the
optimal risk-minimizing counterparty or price counterparty risk into a de-
rivative contract. Consequently, it is impossible for any one investor on a
liquid market to avoid incurring counterparty default risk. 59
Even if it were possible to obtain counterparty specific information,
however, it would not be possible to use differentiating price on the deriv-
ative markets due to the fungibility of derivatives on a liquid exchange.
Rather, any such cost would have to be capitalized into all of the con-
tracts traded on the exchange. This solution, however, is not available to
liquid derivative markets either. If pricing was used in this manner, mar-
ginal hedging investors would be priced out of the market; to maintain
liquidity, therefore, additional speculators would be necessary to fill the
void. The resulting increase of higher-risk speculators and decrease of
lower-risk hedgers would increase the overall default risk in the market,
requiring another increase in the price to reflect this risk, which would
lead to an unsustainable pricing spiral.60 Consequently, price cannot be
used on a liquid exchange to take into account the differing default risk of
counterparties. 61 The primary consequence of risk decoupling and liquid-
ity providers, therefore, is that investors in such markets must accept the
chance of bearing some unpriced default risk (depending on the
counterparty) in exchange for the low transaction costs provided by the
liquid markets. 62
59. To the extent an investor acquires a derivative with a liquidity provider hedge fund
as a counterparty, such default risk is determined by the ability of the hedge fund to dy-
namically hedge their derivative positions. Dynamic hedging is subject to both model fail-
ure and liquidity constraints, each of which is outside of the knowledge or control of the
investor. See Cooper & Mello, supra note 26, at 599.
60. See Mozumdar, supra note 33, at 222 ("Attempting to compensate the swap dealer
for the default risk of speculative swaps by raising the cost of swapping to the counterparty
would only exacerbate the speculative intent of the pool of counterparties, thereby further
increasing default risk and leading to a breakdown in the swap market."). Perhaps even
more perversely, marginal hedging investors could be converted into rational speculators
due solely to this increase in cost in the derivative position, since the increased cost could
exceed the threshold for rational speculation for marginal investors. See id.
61. See id. Instead of using price differentiation, liquid markets exclude counterpar-
ties from participation in the liquid market based on their credit rating. Since no investor
can tell if a particular counterparty is a hedging investor or a speculator, the market uses
credit rating as a proxy for the equity holder's vega. See id. at 234 ("[D]ealers have to rely
upon the observed counterparty credit rating ... to infer the swapping motive[, but] it is
impossible to precisely distinguish between hedgers and non-hedgers on this basis due to
the noisiness of observed credit quality ... ").
62. See Cooper & Mello, supra note 26, at 598-99 ("There are two types of risk in swap
transactions: rate risk, and default risk. . . . [D]efault risk . . . is much more difficult to
hedge."). Further, and perhaps more troubling, such default risk can almost never be di-
versified away simply by entering into additional derivatives with hedge funds. For exam-
ple, under at least one study it was determined that, since potential defaults could be
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In response to this problem, modern liquid derivatives markets
adopted the use of intermediaries such as clearinghouses, not to reduce
transaction costs (which are minimized by the liquidity of the market),
but to ameliorate the effects of this structural counterparty default risk
problem. Clearinghouses do so by pooling default risk, such that the risk
of default for any one derivative investor is not that their specific
counterparty will default but rather that the default would exceed the
collective resources of the clearinghouse. As a result, an investor seeking
to acquire a financial derivative on a liquid market would place the order
with the clearinghouse, which then separately executes the order with a
counterparty. 63
Clearinghouses operate to mitigate risk primarily through three mecha-
nisms: (1) margin, (2) mark-to-market, and (3) netting.64 First, the
clearinghouse requires investors to post margin with the clearinghouse
prior to investing in a derivative, which serves as security on the embed-
ded contingent liability in the derivative position. Second, the clearing-
house marks the derivative contract to market on a daily basis based on
the trading price on the liquid market. Daily marking to market com-
bined with daily margin account adjustments serve to prevent the
counterparty default risk from increasing unabated as the embedded lia-
bility in the derivative increases on an unrealized basis. 65 Third, the
clearinghouse nets all positions held by a particular counterparty. Net-
ting effectively serves as an additional form of margin, preventing
counterparties from realizing on their winning bets while defaulting on
their losing bets.66
extreme, the ability to diversify default risk through investment in multiple hedge funds
was severely limited. See Corentin Christory, Stdphane Daul & Jean-Ren6 Giraud, Quan-
tification of Hedge Fund Default Risk, 9 J. ALTERNATIVE INVESTMENTS 71, 83 (2006)
("[T]he extreme operational risk of hedge funds is a risk that is difficult to diversify .... ").
63. With respect at least to listed futures, a second intermediary plays an important
role in the liquid derivative markets: the Introducing Broker or Futures Commission
Merchant (collectively, FCMs). The FCM serves as the intermediary between the individ-
ual investors and the clearinghouse. In effect, the FCMs are the members of the clearing-
house, and it is the positions of the FCMs that are subject to margin, mark-to-market, and
netting at the clearinghouse. The FCMs collect margin from their individual customers to
post the combined margin for the clearinghouse. The FCMs thus effectively serve a
smaller risk-pooling function, pooling the risks of their clients among themselves in addi-
tion to relying upon the credit of the clearinghouse to support the counterparty risk of the
liquid market as a whole. Due in part to this function, FCMs have been subject to en-
hanced scrutiny, including registration with the CFTC since the adoption of the Commod-
ity Futures Modernization Act of 2000. See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000); see also David B. Esau, Comment, Joint
Regulation of Single Stock Futures: Cause or Result of Regulatory Arbitrage and Inter-
agency Turf Wars?, 51 CAmI. U. L. REV. 917, 929-32 (2002).
64. See, e.g., Jerry W. Markham, "Confederate Bonds, " "General Custer," and the Reg-
ulation of Derivative Instruments, 25 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 61-68 (1994).
65. See id. at 68 ("The posting of margin on positions marked-to-market daily provides
a very reliable method for assuring appropriate risk recognition. Clearinghouses will re-
duce counterparty risk for both dealers and end users.").
66. See id. at 66 ("Netting simply involves the offsetting of similar contracts with a




Through these mechanisms, the clearinghouse serves as a form of self-
insurance, spreading the risk of any one counterparty default among all
of the members of the clearinghouse. 67 As with any form of insurance,
however, if the clearinghouse miscalculates risk or premiums, then all in-
vestors would be subject to the risk of default by any one investor, if the
default amount exceeded the total pooled assets of the clearinghouse. 68
As long as individual counterparties were sufficiently small or traded in
traditional assets, the likelihood of a clearinghouse miscalculating default
risk to such an extent that could potentially bankrupt the exchange was
minimal. The introduction of modern financial speculators acting as li-
quidity providers fundamentally changed this, however, since the busi-
ness model of liquidity providers was precisely to consolidate and
magnify risk through increasingly complicated financial instruments. The
problem is that there is no way for clearinghouses to know the specific
default risk of a particular speculator, and thus set the margin accounts,
with any degree of certainty.69
This problem is exacerbated in the case of liquidity providers because
one of the most significant sources of their collateral tends to be illiquid
hedging positions.70 The valuation of such positions by the clearing-
house, although crucial to calculating margin, proves difficult precisely
because the liquidity provider's method of valuation for these instru-
ments relies on their proprietary trading models, which are opaque at
best, 71 and which they tend to overvalue in their self-reported disclo-
67. See, e.g., Jonathan H. Rushdoony, Risk Management of Financial Derivatives, in
935 PLI/CoRP 9, 33 (1996).
68. This should only be the case to the extent the clearinghouse miscalculates default
risk (and thus margin requirements) of its customers, which is not purely theoretical be-
cause it did in fact occur. In 1985, as a result of an unexpected price shock that signifi-
cantly reduced their net futures position, certain large customers of Volume Investors (a
FCM) defaulted on their futures obligations based on the daily mark-to-market price and
the resulting margin call. In response, the clearinghouse immediately seized the entire
amount of Volume's margin, including that posted by non-defaulting customers. As a re-
sult, the non-defaulting customers were themselves in default, since they could not meet
the margin requirement with respect to their positions. See James V. Jordan & George
Emir Morgan, Default Risk in Futures Markets: The Customer-Broker Relationship, 45 J.
FIN. 909, 910 (1990). The Clearinghouse did eventually agree to make the non-defaulting
investors whole due to reputational concerns and industry pressure. See David Bates &
Roger Craine, Valuing the Futures Market Clearinghouse's Default Exposure During the
1987 Crash, 31 J. MONEY, CREDIT, & BANKING 248, 249 (1999); see also Roberta Romano,
A Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation, 55 MD. L. REV. 1, 21
n.46 (1996).
69. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 15, at 1468-69 ("In sum then, the buyer of the option is
subject to a credit risk equal to the market value of the option, but, unless one knows the
future, it appears impossible to quantify the 'time value,' and hence, the market value of
the option.").
70. The method adopted by the industry, "counterparty credit risk management"
(CCRM), does not perfectly measure counterparty risk, although it may be the best option
available. See John Kambhu et al., Hedge Funds, Financial Intermediation, and Systemic
Risk, FRBNY ECON. POL. REV., Dec. 2007, at 1-2, http://www.newyorkfed.org/researchl
epr/07v13n3/0712kamb.pdf.
71. See e.g., IMF HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 8, at 54 ("[M]any hedge funds
avoid allowing any counterparty to obtain full transparency to its trading and investment
strategies, based largely on a desire to protect proprietary information .... ).
[Vol. 62
The Hidden Costs of a Modern Income Tax
sures.72 As a result, a speculator may fully comply with margin require-
ments, and thus appear riskless, but yet be under-collateralized. 73 Due to
these problems, modern clearinghouses face an increasingly impractica-
ble choice-to either price the unpriceable or lose the liquidity necessary
to maintain the exchange. 74
Consequently, no clearinghouse is able to perfectly assess the risk ex-
posure of a liquidity provider, and thus the market can become uninten-
tionally over-exposed to default risk.75 One possible solution, to raise the
price of the derivatives, is not available to the clearinghouse due to the
price spiraling problem. 76 Another solution, to require more collateral as
default risk rises, could cause more harm than good by resulting in mar-
gin calls precisely when counterparties are at their most vulnerable. 77
72. See Nicolas P. B. Bollen & Veronika K. Pool, Do Hedge Fund Managers Misreport
Returns? Evidence from the Pooled Distribution 28-29 (Vanderbilt University, Working Pa-
per, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1018663.
73. For example, the most commonly used risk metric ("Value at Risk" or "VAR") has
been found to significantly understate a hedge fund's risk of loss in a negative market. See,
e.g., Vikas Agarwal & Narayan Y. Naik, Risks and Portfolio Decisions Involving Hedge
Funds, 17 REV. FIN. STUD. 63, 86 (2004); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of
the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased
Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 345-46. In addition, hedge funds often enter into deriva-
tives directly or indirectly with other hedge funds, further multiplying this distortion. See,
e.g., Kambhu et al., supra note 70, at 11-12.
74. See Kambhu et al., supra note 70 at 1 ("Effective CCRM is obviously needed for
any counterparty, but hedge funds differ in important ways such as their use of complex
trading strategies and instruments, leverage, opacity, and convex compensation structures,
all of which increase the challenges to effective CCRM.").
75. See id.; see also Hu, supra note 15, at 1480 ("In the early days of the swap market
some institutions did not even recognize swaps as having any credit risk at all. Today, there
is concern that some dealers do not understand the full risks associated with ... deriva-
tives.") (internal footnotes omitted); Randall S. Kroszner, Can the Financial Markets Pri-
vately Regulate Risk?: The Development of Derivatives Clearinghouses and Recent Over-
the-Counter Innovations, 31 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 596, 600-04 (1999).
76. In fact, price increases to reflect default risk have not been generally adopted by
the markets. See Bomfim, supra note 57, at 32-33.
[D]ealers by and large do not adjust their posted rates in response to changes
in counterparty credit risk .... [T]he finding of no statistically significant role
for counterparty credit risk in the determination of market swap rates should
not be taken to mean that financial market participants and regulators can
simply think of swaps as riskless contracts and ignore the potential for de-
fault-related losses in swap books. After all, it is the very existence of work-
ing procedures for mitigating counterparty risk that is presumably partly
responsible for the lack of sensitivity of swap rates to common proxies for
counterparty credit risk.
Id.
77. See Henny Sender, Insuring Against Credit Risk Can Carry Risks of Its Own,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 2007, at C1.
Feeding worries about problems in the credit-derivatives market is the lack
of transparency and precise data.... The prudent thing for any single bank to
do when times are tough is to demand more collateral and margin from
hedge-fund clients. But as the banks force hedge funds to put up more of
their own capital, they could trigger additional losses, adding more volatility
to financial markets.
Id. Further, even if clearinghouses wanted to require more collateral (or were forced to do
it through regulation), such an approach could lead to a downward spiral by converting
counterparties into gambling speculators just to cover their losses, further increasing de-
fault risk imposed on the system as a whole. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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Consequently, some default risk remains unpriced in the market.
Ironically, it is precisely the mechanisms intended to protect the mar-
ket from this default risk, that is, margin, netting, and mark-to-market,
which make the presence of single large counterparties, such as liquidity
providers, so significant. 78 Assuming a liquidity provider were to face a
shock in the worldwide economy (such as the 1987 stock market crash or
the 1998 Asian currency crisis and Russian debt default), three potential
consequences could arise that would be problematic for the liquid deriva-
tives market. First, in response to an increase in the liability position of
the derivative contracts of the liquidity provider, the liquidity provider
would be forced to sell low liquidity assets to meet the margin require-
ment on its derivatives. This would result in a "funnel" effect, a sharp
and dramatic decrease on the price of the assets, further hurting the fi-
nancial health of the speculator and leading to a downward price spiral in
the market. 79 Second, a "knock-on" effect could occur, causing other
holders of the actual risky asset to suffer significant and unexpected
losses, severely impairing their credit, and thus negatively impacting the
creditors of these investors.80 Third, the mass liquidation of positions by
the liquidity provider could lead to a "chain reaction" for derivative
counterparties, which were relying on the derivatives to meet their own
margin requirements."' Such a chain reaction would require the investors
to either meet margin with additional funds or liquidate their own posi-
tions, further resulting in downward pressure on the price of the underly-
ing asset and threatening the creditworthiness of the counterparty.82
The combination of these three effects has been demonstrated by the
modern "credit crunch" and the subsequent liquidity freeze. The collapse
of some of Wall Street's most storied names can be thought of as attrib-
uted partly to the combination of the funnel, knock-on, and chain reac-
tion effects, resulting in the inability of such institutions to sell their
mortgage-based financial assets. The story of such collapses is not neces-
sarily that these institutions did not have assets to satisfy their debts, but
rather that they did not have the liquidity to convert their offsetting bets
into covering positions.83 This led to a call on their assets by existing
78. See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S WORKING GROUP REPORT, supra note 8, at 23; see also
Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 241-42 (2008).
79. The funnel effect is similar to a traditional "short squeeze" effect, but in the oppo-
site direction. See, e.g., Franklin R. Edwards, Hedge Funds and the Collapse of Long-Term
Capital Management, 13 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 189, 202 (1999) (discussing the funnel,
knock-on, and chain reaction effects).
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See, e.g., IMF HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 8, at 50 ("[R]equirements for
collateral and other credit terms may ... force hedge funds to liquidate positions at the
worst time, and possibly exacerbate deteriorating market conditions and weaken the
counterparty's position.").
83. See, e.g., Louis Story, Citadel Chief Denies Rumors of Trouble, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
25, 2008, at B1 ("[M]ost of the funds' losses were mark-to-market losses, which he thought
were caused by a lack of liquidity and not by weakened assets. Earlier this year, investment
banks said their losses were being caused by similar liquidity problems.").
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creditors, and hesitancy by future creditors to extend additional credit.8 4
As a consequence, once thriving historic financial businesses quickly went
bankrupt.8 5 The ultimate result was that the creditors of these specula-
tors, who assumed they were creditworthy, were left holding the bag.8 6
The logical conclusion from the funnel, knock-on, and chain reaction
effects, supported by anecdotal evidence from the credit crunch, is that
every investor in the liquid derivative market bears a portion of the po-
tential default risk of every financial speculator acting as a liquidity pro-
vider. Assuming that such speculators are necessary actors in a liquid
derivatives market, in effect every investor entering into a derivative on a
liquid market bears such default risk to some degree, either with respect
to any one default in excess of pooled risk protection in the case of a
clearinghouse, or with respect to a funnel and/or chain reaction effect in
the case of a default by a liquidity provider, or both.8 7 Since single large
counterparties magnify this risk, as hedge funds and investment banks
increasingly participated in the liquid derivative markets, the risk im-
posed on the market as a whole intensified, becoming increasingly rele-
vant to areas outside traditional risk management and financial
regulation, such as the income tax, as well.
III. TAXATION, RISK, AND MODERN FINANCIAL MARKETS
To understand how, if at all, the introduction of this new default risk
may impact an income tax, such risk must be introduced into the taxation
and risk model to determine whether such risks would even be subject to
taxation under an optimal tax system. At first, approaching risk from the
perspective of taxation seems relatively straightforward-since risky as-
sets can generate positive returns, a tax on risk must reduce those returns
to the investor and raise revenue for the government. The taxation and
risk model challenges this intuition, by establishing that, under a certain
set of assumptions, risky returns can in fact escape taxation altogether.88
84. See Story & White, supra note 2.
Lehman had put down securities it believed were worth $6 billion during the
summer to assuage the bank's concerns that its trades were risky. But JPMor-
gan thought those securities had deteriorated in value, and asked for $5 bil-
lion in cash or liquid assets on Sept. 4. Over the course of the next week,
JPMorgan requested more money from Lehman. . . .By the weekend of
Sept. 14-15, most Lehman workers knew the firm's days as an independent
bank were over.
Id.
85. See Andrew Ross Sorkin, Lehman Files for Bankruptcy; Merrill is Sold, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008, at Al.
86. See Jonathon D. Glater & Gretchen Morgenson, A Fight for a Piece of What's Left,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16, 2008, at C8 ("A worldwide battle began on Monday over the remains
of Lehman Brothers as the biggest bankruptcy filing in history sent creditors scrambling to
protect their investments.").
87. See Edwards, supra note 79, at 202.
88. This insight has served as the basis for a number of revolutions in the analysis of a
normative income tax. See, e.g., Bankman & Griffith, supra note 7.
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At first glance, the taxation and risk model supports the concept that
all risk escapes taxation, assuming the absence of structurally unpriced
and non-diversifiable risks. Such an assumption, however, does not take
into account the unique nature of default risk on liquid derivatives mar-
kets. Taking this into account, the question becomes more complicated-
can a facially neutral income tax still cause adverse consequences when
risk decoupling is introduced? Based on a number of relatively conserva-
tive assumptions, the answer can turn out to be yes.
A. THE TAXATION AND RISK MODEL
Broadly speaking, risky returns are those returns based on the risk of
an occurrence; more specifically, risky returns are those based on the
probability of an occurrence but not based on uncertainties. 89 The classic
risk-based return is the coin flip. Assuming a fair coin, there is a 50%
chance on any coin flip that the coin will come up heads or tails. A bet
that the coin will be heads is a pure risk-based bet.90 Assuming a $100
bet and a fair coin, the present value of each bet is $50, and each party to
the coin flip grants a contingent promise worth $50 for a reciprocal con-
tingent promise worth $50. Although the present values of the two bets
are identical, the two bets are not the same-after all, one will lose and
one will win. The bet thus represents both a contingent asset and a con-
tingent liability to each party, in that each party has a 50% chance of
being owed money or owing money. In other words, the pure-risk bet
embeds a liability into the risk-based position; the only question is the
direction of the liability.
What is the effect of imposing an income tax on a pure-risk bet? As-
suming the government imposes a 50% tax, all gains and losses are taxed
on a mark-to-market basis, losses are fully refundable, and the system is
closed, for every $100 bet made, each party would only win or lose $50
after taxes: the winner would win $100 and owe $50 to the government,
the loser would lose $100 and be paid $50 by the government for the loss,
and the government would be revenue neutral since the $50 of tax col-
lected from the winner would be paid to the loser.
The crucial insight provided by Professors Evsey Domar and Richard
Musgrave is that taxpayers should be wholly indifferent to taxes on pure-
risk bets. 91 At first glance this seems counterintuitive, since the winner of
the bet will have received $50, rather than the original $100, due solely to
89. See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Why the Law Hates Speculators: Regulation and Private
Ordering in the Market for OTC Derivatives, 48 DUKE L.J. 701, 743 (1999); see generally
Anthony B. Atkinson & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Taxation and Risk-Taking, in LECrURES ON
PUBLIC ECONOMICS 97 (1980).
90. There is no time-value component of the bet because no cash is invested up-front
to make the bet. Instead, the two parties to the bet exchange contingent risk-based bets
with identical present values; in this case, one person bets on heads and one person bets on
tails. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
91. See Evsey D. Domar & Richard A. Musgrave, Proportional Income Taxation and
Risk-Taking, 58 Q. J. ECON. 388, 390 (1944).
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the imposition of the tax. The solution described by Domar and Mus-
grave provides that the parties to a pure-risk bet should simply increase
the size of their bet to offset the tax rate. 92 Thus, in the example above,
the parties could simply double the nominal size of their bet to $200.9 3 In
such case, the winner would receive $200 and pay $100 to the government
in taxes, while the loser would pay $200 to the winner but receive $100
from the government. The net effect would be for the parties to win or
lose a net of $100, precisely the result the taxpayers preferred in the no-
tax world.94
Similarly, an income tax nominally taxes gains derived from capital in-
vestments.95 For example, if a taxpayer were to make an investment in a
share of stock for $1,000 and the price of the stock rose to $2,000, at
which time the taxpayer sold the stock for cash, the taxpayer would have
$1,000 of taxable gain.96 Notwithstanding the relatively straightforward
nature of this investment and its nominal taxation, the income taxation
and risk literature challenges whether such gains are truly subject to tax.9 7
It does so by deconstructing returns from capital investments into (1)
time-value returns and (2) risk-based returns. 98
It is relatively straightforward to see why this is the case. In the exam-
ple above, the taxpayer invested $1,000 in stock, which means the tax-
payer did not invest in a risk-free asset such as Treasury securities. To the
extent that the risk-free rate is greater than zero, a rational taxpayer
would not have invested in the stock unless it provided at least the risk-
free rate of return.99 Assuming the risk-free rate is 4%, why did the tax-
payer invest in a stock that does not pay at least a guaranteed $40? The
answer provided by the theory is that the stock does in fact pay the $40
risk-free return, but "embeds" the return into the overall return on the
stock.1 00
92. See id.; see also Noel B. Cunningham, The Taxation of Capital Income and the
Choice of Tax Base, 52 TAx L. REV. 17, 31 (1996) ("[I]f an investor were willing to invest
$1,000 in a risky venture in a world without taxes, she should be willing to invest $1,000, (1-
t) in that venture in a world with a normative proportional income tax.").
93. $100/(1-.5)=$200.
94. See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 4, at 2. What becomes clear upon considering the
Domar-Musgrave theorem is that it relies on the ability of taxpayers to scale-up risky in-
vestments without transaction costs. Any transaction costs act as a net cost to the parties
engaging in the risky bet solely to mitigate the effect of the taxes. See, e.g., Cunningham,
supra note 92, at 39-43. Derivatives serve to reduce these transaction costs and thus be-
come a relevant point of analysis in the model. See Schizer, supra note 17, at 1904.
95. See 26 U.S.C. § 61 (2000).
96. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 61, 1001 (2000).
97. See Weisbach, supra note 4, at 2.
98. See id. at 12-21. In addition, investments have a third component: inframarginal
returns. Inframarginal returns refer to returns in excess of the sum of the risk-free rate of
return plus the risky return. This is possible due to the skill and effort of the officers or
employees. For purposes of this Article, it is sufficient to focus only on risk and risk-free
returns, since the treatment of inframarginal returns are unaffected under the taxation and
risk model. See id. at 19-21.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 13-14.
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Since the investment returns the risk-free rate of return, a risk-neutral
investor would purchase any investment where the risk-adjusted present
value of the risky portion of the stock was zero, such as in the coin flip.
For example, a risk-neutral investor should be indifferent between invest-
ing $1 or $1,000,000 in an investment that pays the risk-free rate of return
plus has a 50% chance of doubling the investment or a 50% chance of
losing the entire investment. This also does not reflect the real world,
however, because investors are not risk-neutral but rather demand com-
pensation for bearing risk. Thus, in the above example, the investor
would demand a greater return, for example, something like winning
$120 if the bet wins, while only losing $100 if the bet loses, before being
willing to make the investment.
As a result, a single investment in a share of stock could be thought of
as representing an investment in both the risk-free rate of return plus a
premium for bearing risk. 10 1 Isolating out the risk-free rate of return
leaves only the risky return of the stock, similar to the results of a coin
flip.102 Unlike a coin flip, however, the risky return embedded in stock is
not a zero-sum game, where for every winner there must be a loser.
Rather, the "risk" at issue may be the systemic risk of the economy as a
whole, a risk particular to the industry in which the company operates
(such as commodities, air travel, technology, etc.), interest-rate risk, legal
risk or idiosyncratic risk of the particular company at issue, or portfolio
allocation risk of the particular investor.10 3 Regardless, to the extent that
any return on stock is purely risk-based, it is similar to that of a coin flip
in the hands of the investor.10 4
Under Domar-Musgrave, the investor should be indifferent as to the
tax on this risky portion of the stock investment, since the investor could
simply increase the bet to mitigate the effects of the tax.105 For example,
assuming an investor buys a share of stock for $100, there are no borrow-
ing constraints, and that the investor borrows at the risk-free rate, the
101. See, e.g., Samuel C. Thompson, Jr., Demystifying the Use of Beta in the Determina-
tion of the Cost of Capital and an Illustration of Its Use in Lazard's Valuation of Conrail, 25
J. CORP. L. 241, 244-46 (2000).
102. See id.
103. See, e.g., Anthony B. Atkinson & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Taxation and Risk-Taking, in
LECTURES ON PUBLIC ECONOMICS 97, 103-04 (1980).
Whether a particular asset is risky or not depends not only on the individual's
consumption plan, but also on what other assets are available to him. For
instance, if the individual holds a large portfolio of equities, and if long-term
bonds are negatively correlated with equities, . . . he may be willing to hold
long-term bonds even if the expected return were lower than the safe rate of
interest.
Id.
104. For example, if an investor owned stock in an electric utility, the return on the
stock could be affected by a particularly hot summer in the area served by the utility, since
a cool summer would mean a lower return due to less electricity being used. In this case,
the summer heat would comprise a risk-based return on the stock. There are a number of
other risk-based returns that could be embedded in the stock of an electric utility, such as
the cost of coal or oil, the cost of labor, or the risk of increased regulatory oversight.
105. See Domar & Musgrave, supra note 91, at 390.
[Vol. 62
The Hidden Costs of a Modern Income Tax
investor could simply borrow an additional $100 and purchase a second
share of stock to mitigate the tax on the risky portion of the stock. Due
to the nature of the capital investment, the investor would have incurred
a cost equal to the risk-free rate (since the investor borrowed capital to
double the bet), but also would have doubled the risk-free return on the
investment. Since these offset, the net effect to the investor would be
that only the original risk-free rate of return would be subject to the
tax.10
6
Domar-Musgrave represents a partial equilibrium model of the income
taxation of risk in that it looks at the effects on the taxpayer of mitigating
the income tax through multiplying investments in risky assets.10 7 With
respect to the government, by imposing a 50% income tax on risky invest-
ments, the government effectively bears 50% of the risk-if the taxpayer
wins the bet, the government will reap half of the benefit, while if the
taxpayer loses the bet, the government bears half of the loss.
In effect, the imposition of the tax on the risky portion of a stock in-
vestment serves to make the government and the taxpayer partners in the
risky investment. 10 8 Assuming all parties are in an optimal equilibrium
pre-tax, compared to a no-tax world the government would be in a sub-
optimal position in that it has now taken on a net risk in excess of its
preferred risk exposure.' 0 9 For the government to return to its preferred
risk position, it would have to offset this risk exposure. 10 The govern-
ment can mitigate such risk by selling it "short" in the market."' In the
classic short sale, an investor borrows a share of stock and sells the stock
in the market at its fair market value."l 2 At maturity, the investor is obli-
gated to return one share of stock regardless of its market value.1 13 If the
value of the stock declines, the short seller will profit, since it will require
less money to return the one share of stock than the investor received
when it borrowed the stock and sold it initially.14
In the general equilibrium model, the government sells its risk back
into the market by shorting the risky investment. 115 As a result, as the
demand for the risky investment increases in light of the imposition of the
income tax, the supply similarly increases due to the short sale by the
government. 116 These two offset each other, such that the total supply
and demand for the risky asset remains unchanged, and thus the price for
106. See Appendix for a numerical description.
107. See, e.g., Daniel N. Shaviro, Replacing the Income Tax with a Progressive Con-
sumption Tax, 103 TAX NoTEs 91, 93-105 (2004).
108. For a detailed discussion of a similar concept, see Hanna, supra note 4, at 388-91.
109. See generally Louis Kaplow, Taxation and Risk Taking: A General Equilibrium
Perspective, 47 NAT'L TAX J. 789 (1994).
110. See id.
111. See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 4, at 12.
112. See, e.g., Yoram Keinan, United States Federal Taxation of Derivatives: One Way or
Many?, 61 TAX LAW. 81, 135-36 (2007).
113. See id.
114. See id.




the risky asset remains unchanged.117 Similarly, the government receives
cash from selling the investment short, but also loans cash to the taxpayer
to make the risky investment." 8 These loans and borrowings also will
offset, such that money supply and interest rates also remain un-
changed."19 Thus, even looking at all actors in the general equilibrium
model, the imposition of an income tax on risky assets can result in only
the taxation of the risk-free return on the initial risky investment, with no
other impact on the taxpayer, the government, or the market.' 20 Under
this general equilibrium analysis, the application of Domar-Musgrave
fully mitigates all impacts of the imposition of the tax, other than on the
initial risk-free return, because the investor and the government appro-
priately made adjustments to the investment in the identical risky asset,
through the use of circular transactions.
Of course, as with all models, the general equilibrium model relies on a
number of assumptions that have been subject to criticism. For example,
one assumption is that the government "rebalances" its risk portfolio by
selling the investment back into the market.l21 What is required to make
this assumption is that the increased demand by the taxpayer for the risky
investment, due to portfolio adjustments, will lead to an increase in mar-
ket price for the investment (that is, a "market signal") and that the gov-
ernment, as a rational actor, in light of the increase in market price will
sell the risky investment short into the market in response.1 22 This as-
sumption, that both taxpayers and the government will make appropriate
portfolio adjustments, has been the subject to significant criticism but has
also been defended.' 23 Solely for purposes of incorporating the taxation
of derivatives and liquidity providers into the general equilibrium model
in Part III, it is sufficient to rely on this assumption as correct. 24 Once
117. In effect, the circular cash flow of the long position entered into by the taxpayer
and the short position entered into by the government fully offset with respect to the risk-
free rate of return. The identical offsetting result will always occur with respect to the
mitigating position under a general equilibrium analysis (although the distributional conse-
quences may differ). See Schizer, supra note 17. As a result, it is sufficient to focus only on
the risky returns and ignore the risk-free return when analyzing such transactions.
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See Kaplow, supra note 109. See Appendix for a numerical description.
121. See, e.g., Weisbach, supra note 4, at 52.
The taxation-and-risk models require the government to adjust its portfolio
by selling securities and investing in risk-free assets. Absent this adjustment,
markets may not clear at existing prices, which means individuals may not be
able to make the required portfolio adjustments. In addition, the pattern of
tax revenues will vary depending on the tax system chosen, which defeats the
equivalences.
Id.
122. In effect, the model assumes that the government knows that the imposition of the
income tax that disturbed the price equilibrium, meaning that the government is bearing
undue risk as a result. See id.
123. See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 7, at 895-96; Weisbach, supra note 4, at 52-56.
124. This is for two reasons: (1) this Article is attempting to introduce the taxation of
hedge funds into the general equilibrium model, and thus will use the same assumptions as
a starting point; and (2) only those assumptions that must be relaxed to introduce deriva-
tives into the model will be modified.
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the model is extrapolated in Part IV, this assumption will be relaxed and
the implications for extending the lessons of the model to the real world
will be more closely examined.
Another assumption in the taxation and risk model is that the taxpayer
can borrow at the risk-free rate to rebalance. 125 In reality, however, tax-
payers cannot borrow at the risk-free rate, but rather must borrow at
higher rates to compensate for the risk that the taxpayer may not be able
to repay. 126 This increased borrowing rate effectively acts as a net cost to
the taxpayer, incurred solely to mitigate the effects of the income tax
under Domar-Musgrave; it can be thought of as a form of regressive tax
(in that the cost of capital is generally higher for taxpayers with lower
income) on the rebalancing of risk in light of the imposition of an income
tax. 127
Broadening this insight to the general equilibrium, even if the taxpayer
defaults on the loan, the taxation of risk remains fully mitigated since the
taxpayer increased the bet on the underlying risky investment, while the
lender fully priced the default risk into the loan itself. Since the increased
demand for liquidity would increase the cost of capital generally, in re-
sponse the government could lend into the market to return the system to
equilibrium. Thus, the problem turns out to be solely a distributional and
incidence one, not a failure of the government to return to the pre-tax
equilibrium.128
This borrowing constraint, and the regressive distributional conse-
quences arising as a result, has served as the basis of criticism for both the
income tax and the taxation and risk model more generally. 12 9 One re-
sponse to this criticism has been that the development of liquid derivative
markets serves to mitigate this problem, since derivatives provide
cheaper ways for taxpayers to increase their bets on risky investments
than loans under the Domar-Musgrave theorem.130 Assuming this is cor-
125. See Cunningham, supra note 92, at 37.
126. See id. For example, rather than pay four percent interest, the taxpayer may be
required to pay six percent on the borrowed funds due to the chance that he may default
on the loan. Assuming the government was risk-neutral, one way to think of this would be
that the government, in making the loan to the taxpayer, has itself made a risky investment
that can be deconstructed into a risk-free return of four percent plus a risky return com-
posed of a chance of receiving an additional two percent or a chance of losing four percent.
See id.
127. See id. at 39-43. The government is indifferent to the net cost to the taxpayer
under general equilibrium, because the value of the interest deduction to the taxpayer will
be exactly offset by the taxes on the interest income by the lender. See Appendix for a
numeric example.
128. See Cunningham, supra note 92; Weisbach, supra note 4, at 52-56. This may be
sufficient from a normative perspective to make changes to the income tax base, but it does
not implicate the equilibrium in the model. See Weisbach, supra note 4, at 52-56.
129. See Cunningham, supra note 92.
130. See Weisbach, supra note 4, at 16 n.23.
[I]f derivative markets in the risk in question exist, the individual need not
borrow and buy an investment. Instead, he can eliminate the tax on risk
merely by increasing his bet through a derivative. This makes the investment




rect, the model would result in an increase in demand for derivative in-
struments linked to risky assets. The remainder of Part III will analyze
this proposition by incorporating the increased demand for derivative in-
struments in response to the imposition of an income tax, and the role
liquidity providers play in supplying this demand, into the income taxa-
tion and risk model.
B. RISK DECOUPLING AND THE MARKET SIGNAL MALFUNCTION
The taxation of derivative investments, standing alone in the Domar-
Musgrave model, has been addressed in the literature and has produced
some intriguing results. The primary lessons of looking at derivatives
under this model are: (1) derivatives provide a cheaper way for taxpayers
to multiply bets on risky investments and thus make Domar-Musgrave
more feasible even in a world with transaction costs and borrowing costs;
and (2) since derivatives, just like a coin flip, are "pure risk" zero-sum
bets, the government can be indifferent as to the tax treatment of them so
long as the "winning" positions and the "losing" positions on any particu-
lar type of derivative investment are treated roughly equally.1 31 Incorpo-
rating these lessons into a general equilibrium model of taxation of risk,
assuming that taxpayers use derivatives to mitigate tax on underlying
risky assets, leads to some surprising conclusions.
Because derivatives would not exist in an efficient market with rational
actors and no transaction costs, to introduce derivatives into the taxation
and risk model, two assumptions in the model must be relaxed: (1) there
must be transaction costs in finding and purchasing risky investments, and
(2) not all taxpayers can borrow at the risk-free rate. 132 After relaxing
these two assumptions, derivatives become relevant in the model since
they serve to reduce both transaction costs and borrowing costs. As a
corollary, derivative counterparties must be introduced into the model,
since derivatives cannot exist absent counterparties, 133 and correspond-
ingly default risk must be introduced as well.
To analyze the extent to which investors can use derivatives as a way to
minimize the impact of the taxation of risky returns under the general
equilibrium model, it is necessary to look not only to the treatment of the
taxpayer and the counterparty, but also to the government and the mar-
ket price for the underlying risky investment. Assuming that the deriva-
tive serves solely as a means to reduce transaction costs but not change
the cash flows, the general equilibrium model holds relatively easily since
Id.
131. More specifically, so long as risk-adjusted present value of tax benefits and tax
costs offset (or the "gain/loss ratio" is one), the government is indifferent as to the tax
treatment of a particular asset. See Schizer, supra note 17, at 1891 ("This Article ... em-
phasizes a context in which scaling up is relatively cheap: derivatives.").
132. This is because derivatives exist to reduce the transaction costs of engaging in such
transactions, as it is much simpler to enter into a derivative than attempt to replicate the
derivative with underlying assets. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
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the cash flows would be identical to those in the general equilibrium
model. 134 This makes intuitive sense-if the cash flows are identical, then
the form of the cash flows should be irrelevant to the systemic
equilibrium.
The use of derivatives traded on a liquid market can raise different and
unique issues in the general equilibrium model, however, because taxpay-
ers would no longer be holding identical assets to mitigate the tax; rather,
a taxpayer would own the original risky asset plus a derivative on the
risky asset. Unlike in the general equilibrium analysis described above,
due to the use of the derivative it is possible for the market price signal to
malfunction, thus disrupting the equilibrium. More specifically, rather
than demand for the underlying risky asset increasing in light of the im-
position of an income tax, demand for derivatives would increase because
derivatives provide a cheaper way for taxpayers to scale than borrowing
to buy the underlying assets. As a result, the market signal of increased
prices of the underlying asset would not occur, since increase in demand
for the asset had not occurred.
What about the increased demand for the derivative? Although
counterintuitive, the increased demand for derivatives would increase
neither the price of the derivative nor of the asset, due to two unique
qualities of the pricing of derivatives: (1) derivatives are priced relative to
the price of the underlying asset and not to the supply and demand of the
derivative, and (2) trading in the derivative does not directly impact the
price of the underlying asset.1 35 Since derivatives are priced with respect
to the value of the underlying asset and not based on supply and demand
of the derivative itself, an increase in the demand for derivatives linked to
a risky asset would not necessarily increase the cost of the asset or the
cost of the derivative. 136 Thus, as taxpayers acquired additional deriva-
tives to mitigate the income tax, the price of both the underlying asset
and the derivative would remain unchanged. In other words, the deriva-
tives market would be absorbing the excess demand for the risky asset,
such that the increased demand would not be reflected in the markets.
137
These unique features of derivative pricing can be demonstrated
through the example of a coin flip. Assume two people wish to bet on a
coin flip and are considering how much to bet. In their discussions, each
134. See Appendix for a numerical description.
135. See supra note 38.
136. Whether asset prices do in fact move in relation to derivatives prices will be con-
sidered in more detail in Part V. However, to the extent there is not a perfectly linear
relationship, some market signal malfunction will occur and the government will bear some
risk through the imposition of the income tax.
137. In the real world, it is possible that the price of derivatives may respond to in-
creases in demand, but this would only occur to the extent of transaction costs (since tax-
payers could use underlying assets once the cost of a derivative exceeds its transaction
costs) and should quickly be arbitraged away by the market. This does not mean that all
derivatives price in accordance with Black-Scholes, but rather that whatever the price, it




person will consider how much they would like to win, how much they
would be willing to lose, the odds of the coin landing heads or tails, and
the risk that the other person would not pay. In deciding whether to bet
$10 or $10,000, however, the parties would not care about how much
other people would bet on the same coin flip. In other words, that Bill
Gates might be willing to risk $10,000 on a coin flip would not influence
whether a law student would risk $10 or $20 on the same coin flip. The
same point can be seen in a different context-the amount of money that
a person living in Boston might be willing to bet on the Red Sox winning
the World Series. The Red Sox fan might take into account a number of
factors in determining how much to bet,' 38 but whether one hundred, one
thousand, or one million other fans in Boston also bet on the Red Sox
winning the World Series would not necessarily be one of them.139
Without any increase in price serving as an effective market signal that
it was bearing risk through the imposition of the income tax, the govern-
ment, even acting rationally, could not rebalance its portfolio in response.
Even accepting the assumptions inherent in Domar-Musgrave, that the
government is entirely rational and rebalances its portfolio upon changes
in market prices arising due to the imposition of an income tax, the gov-
ernment would not be able to offset its assumed risk when derivatives are
involved. As a result, the government would remain in a partnership in
the original risky investment with the taxpayer through the imposition of
an income tax. Thus, solely because a taxpayer used a derivative rather
than the underlying asset to mitigate the imposition of an income tax, the
government would effectively bear a sub-optimal amount of risk.1 40
In a world where default risk was priced into the contracts, this would
not be a concern, since the government could see the increase in default
risk in the market as more investors demanded derivatives and thus more
risky counterparties entered the market. Since liquid derivatives markets
are imperfect in this respect, default risk continues to grow as more and
larger liquidity providers enter the market, pooling and magnifying their
default risk, but no increase in the price of derivatives on the market
occurs. Thus, the government bears an increasing amount of default risk
through the imposition of an income tax. This is the heart of the market
signal malfunction - that the use of derivatives by taxpayers in a world
138. For example, these could include the health of the players, the desire for bragging
rights over the other bettor, the ability of the manager of the baseball club, and potential
personal distractions for particular players, among others.
139. This is the case for bilateral bets, but not for bets against a single counterparty
such as a casino sports book. In a casino sports book, the house does change odds based
on how many people bet on one team or the other, solely to attract more people to bet,
since the casino makes money based on the number of bets placed, not the winner of the
game. Similarly, this would not be the case in pari-mutuel bets such as horse racing (where
the bets are pooled and used to pay off winners), where odds are constantly fluctuating
based on the amount of bets placed so as to maximize the available pool of money. For a
discussion of the efficiency of pari-mutuel betting, see generally Richard H. Thaler & Wil-
liam T. Ziemba, Anomalies: Parimutuel Betting Markets: Racetracks and Lotteries, 2 J.
ECON. PERSP. 161 (1988).
140. See Appendix for a numerical example.
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with an income tax can cause the government to bear a greater amount of
risk than it would either in a world where the taxpayer utilized underlying
assets to mitigate the tax or one absent income taxes.
C. RISK DECOUPLING AND THE DISTRIBUTIONAL MALFUNCTION
Due to the market signal malfunction, the government may bear some
default risk through the imposition of an income tax in a world with fi-
nancial derivatives. In addition, the risk that the counterparty may de-
fault also changes the analysis under the general equilibrium model
because, to the extent a taxpayer entered into a derivative on a liquid
derivative market, the cash flows are no longer identical to the general
equilibrium model. Unlike in the general equilibrium model, when a tax-
payer invests in a derivative to mitigate the effect of an income tax, the
taxpayer no longer holds two identical risky investments; rather the tax-
payer owns the original risky asset and a derivative on the risky asset that
also bears some risk that the counterparty will default. It therefore be-
comes necessary to introduce the investment profile of the counterparty
into the analysis.141 This is relevant precisely because the increase in de-
mand for derivative investments, caused by the imposition of an income
tax, would lead to an increase in speculative counterparties in the deriva-
tives market, since speculators are necessary to provide the liquidity re-
quired to absorb this increased demand. 142
Assume a taxpayer owns a risky investment and the government im-
poses a 50% tax. Due to transaction costs, the taxpayer enters into a
derivative to increase the risky investment and thus mitigate the tax
under Domar-Musgrave by placing an order on a liquid market, and the
market-maker places the order with a speculator as the counterparty.
Assuming the risky asset wins, the taxpayer earns a positive return on the
underlying asset and is owed money on the derivative contract; rather
than pay, however, the speculator counterparty defaults on the deriva-
tive. As a result, the taxpayer ex post earned only the single risky return,
notwithstanding that the taxpayer had nominally increased the bet pursu-
ant to Domar-Musgrave ex ante. Since the taxpayer did not in fact in-
crease the return on the risky asset, the risky return on the original
investment still bears a real income tax liability. By contrast, if the risky
asset loses, the taxpayer will owe a liability on the derivative. Assuming
the taxpayer pays, the speculator makes a profit. This is the heart of the
distributional malfunction - that increased demand for derivatives caused
by the imposition of an income tax leads to an increase in the chance of
entering into a derivative with a party who will default.
Returning to the coin flip example, this malfunction becomes more ap-
parent. Assume a taxpayer enters into a coin flip with a solvent
141. For example, since hedging counterparties have very different business models
from liquidity providers, the impact on the cash flows in the general equilibrium model will
differ as well. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
142. See Krawiec, supra note 15, at 15.
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counterparty for $100, and the government imposes a 50% tax. The tax-
payer wants to make another $100 bet on the coin flip, but assume that
the existing counterparty either does not want to or is not available.
Thus, the taxpayer makes another $100 bet on the same coin flip with an
unrelated speculator (for example, if there were no other counterparties
willing to take the bet). The taxpayer wins the coin flip, and the initial,
solvent counterparty pays the taxpayer $100. The speculator, however,
does not pay. The taxpayer ends up paying $50 to the government and is
left with only $50. If the taxpayer loses the coin flip, however, the tax-
payer pays $100 to the initial counterparty and $100 to the speculator,
receiving $100 from the government for the loss. Literally, for the specu-
lator, it is "heads I win, tails you lose" situation, created solely by the
introduction of an income tax.143
The net result for the government is to bear half of the risk on the
initial investment in the risky asset due to the market signal malfunc-
tion-the same result as if the taxpayer had not entered into any Domar-
Musgrave transaction-plus providing incentives for excess risk-taking by
speculators at the expense of existing investors. In other words, the crea-
tion of demand for derivative counterparties by the introduction of the
income tax serves to transfer part of the benefit of the risky asset from the
taxpayer to the speculative counterparties, because increased demand for
derivatives increases the need for speculators, which itself increases the
amount of unpriced default risk in the system as a whole.
In many ways, the distributional malfunction is a manifestation of the
transaction cost distributive problem already identified in the litera-
ture. 144 For example, if a taxpayer borrows money to scale up an invest-
ment in response to the imposition of an income tax, the taxpayer bears
the cost of capital and the lender profits from making the loan, while the
demand for increased loans was generated by the imposition of the in-
come tax. Thus, the imposition of the income tax serves to transfer part
of the benefit from the taxpayer to the lender. The main difference in the
distributional malfunction is that it is embedded in the interaction of the
derivatives market and the income tax, rather than more transparent
through the increased cost of capital, such as higher interest rates, and
thus can be invisible to both the taxpayer and the government.
IV. THE IMPLICIT SUBSIDY: CAN AN INCOME TAX
SUBSIDIZE FINANCIAL SPECULATORS?
Under the model, the combination of an income tax and a liquid deriv-
atives market with speculators providing liquidity results in (1) all inves-
tors who utilize liquid market derivatives to mitigate the income tax
bearing the distributional malfunction, regardless whether their particular
counterparty is a liquidity provider, and (2) the government bearing a
143. For a more detailed example, see the Appendix.
144. See Cunningham, supra note 92, at 33, 35-36.
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portion of the speculator's default risk due to the market signal malfunc-
tion. As a result, both the government and the investor are in a sub-
optimal position as compared to the initial utility-maximizing equilib-
rium. Whether and to what extent these occur no longer rests on the
ability of taxpayers to scale up investments, or of the government to
rebalance its portfolio, but rather solely on how effectively the specula-
tors identify and manage their own default risk.
14 5
With respect to (1), all investors in risky assets prior to the introduction
of an income tax would effectively subsidize speculative liquidity provid-
ers through the increased demand for derivatives and the distributional
malfunction. With respect to (2), it is actually possible for all taxpayers,
regardless if they own risky assets, to subsidize liquidity providers as well,
since the government is placed in a sub-optimal investment profile. Even
if a subsidy to liquidity providers by investors in risky assets was not
troubling, the potential subsidy by all taxpayers, even those with no con-
nection to financial markets or financial speculators, requires closer at-
tention so appropriate responses can be considered.
A. How INVESTORS CAN SUBSIDIZE SPECULATORS
IN THE REAL WORLD
Applying the results from the model to "real world" financial deriva-
tives markets requires an inquiry into the following questions: (1) is there
a unique class of investors serving the role of liquidity providers to the
financial derivatives markets; and (2) if so, who bears the costs of the
default risk of such liquidity providers. As discussed in Part II, it turns
out that there is such a class of investors-liquidity providers-and that
all investors in financial derivative assets traded on liquid exchanges bear
a portion of their default risk due to the imperfect functioning of liquid
markets and clearinghouses.
Further, and perhaps more importantly, under Domar-Musgrave it is
the presence of the income tax itself that incentivizes taxpayers to enter
the derivatives market so as to mitigate the tax on risk. Thus, the greater
the income tax on risk, the more investors in risky assets will have an
incentive to demand derivatives to rebalance, requiring more liquidity in
the market, leading to more liquidity providers. As more liquidity prov-
iders enter the liquid derivatives market, greater default risk is shifted
onto the market, concentrating more default risk exposure at the
clearinghouse, which is spread among all the derivative contracts traded
on the exchange, resulting in all derivative investors bearing a portion of
this increased risk. Since the clearinghouse and the market cannot per-
fectly price this risk into its contracts, all investors bear a share of this
unpriced credit risk, solely due to the imposition of an income tax.
145. To the extent hedge funds utilize "Value at Risk" models to do so, it is likely that
they are not effectively managing their liquidity risk, at least in the face of market down-
turns. See Kambhu et al., supra note 70, at 6; see also Davidoff, supra note 56, at 252-53.
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Assuming this is correct, the issue then becomes to what extent an ac-
tual income tax may result in such an implicit subsidy, as opposed to the
stylized model. Among other things, an actual income tax does not pro-
vide for full loss offsets,146 has progressive tax rates 147 and preferential
capital gains tax rates, 148 and primarily utilizes a realization regime rather
than a mark-to-market regime,149 any one of which could impact the con-
clusions drawn from the model.150
What is interesting with regard to the implicit subsidy, however, is that
the shift from the model to the real world income tax can actually serve
to exacerbate, rather than mitigate, some of the problems identified in
the model. For example, limiting the deductibility for a risky loss can act
as a form of penalty on investors that happen to lose their risky invest-
ment, by removing the government's share of the loss.15' This may or
may not be considered problematic from a normative perspective. 52 On
the one hand, since nobody knows who will be winners and who will be
losers ex ante, it seems unfair to punish those who happen to lose ex post
while the winners receive the full benefit of Domar-Musgrave to avoid
the tax; on the other hand, it may seem appropriate to punish speculators
who incur large losses by disallowing their tax benefits. 53
Regardless of the normative conclusion on this issue generally, the re-
sults prove particularly troubling in the context of financial derivatives
traded on liquid exchanges, because disallowing losses would dispropor-
tionately harm real investors while having little impact on speculators.
For example, assume an investor buys one share of risky stock and then,
in response to the imposition of a tax, enters into a derivative with re-
spect to the share of stock with a speculator. If the stock loses value, the
investor would lose money on both the asset and the derivative; since the
investor would also be disallowed any tax benefit form the loss, the inves-
tor would bear the entire loss. If the stock increases in value, however,
the investor would win on the stock but on the derivative the
counterparty could simply default. The investor would only win on half
of the bet, while the speculator would incur a loss. The speculator would
146. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 1211 (2000).
147. 26 U.S.C. § 1(a)-1(d) (2000).
148. 26 U.S.C. § 1(h) (2000).
149. 26 U.S.C. §1001 (2000); Cottage Sav. Ass'n v. Comm'r, 499 U.S. 554, 559 (1991); cf
26 U.S.C. § 475, § 1256 (2000).
150. For example, not allowing full loss offsets has often been pointed to as an example
of how the actual income tax may reach risk-based returns notwithstanding Domar-Mus-
grave, although not necessarily-in an optimal manner. See Deborah H. Schenk, Saving the
Income Tax with a Wealth Tax, 53 TAX L. REV. 423, 430 (2000) ("[An income tax with loss
limitations imposes a burden on the return to risk on capital only for those who cannot
avoid the limitations .... ").
151. See Weisbach, supra note 4, at 40 ("The main effect of taxing risky returns with
graduated rates, therefore, is to hurt those who are worse off.").
152. Cf. Huang, supra note 15, at 514-15.
153. See Sarah B. Lawsky, Fairly Random: On Compensation Audited Taxpayers, 41
CONN. L. REV. 161, 171-74 (2008).
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be indifferent to this, however, since they never intended to incur a real
loss in the first place.
In this case, in all circumstances the loss limitation would serve only to
harm the real investor who entered into the derivative solely due to the
imposition of the income tax, while doing nothing to the incentives of the
pure gambling speculator. The only alternative available to such an in-
vestor ex ante would be to not enter into a Domar-Musgrave transaction,
which would also punish the investor because such an investor would ef-
fectively bear a tax on their winning risky returns. Either way, ex post the
imposition of a tax with loss limitations by the government would disad-
vantage losing investors, both as compared to winning investors and to
speculators.
A similar analysis applies to progressive rates. As discussed above,
under an income tax with a single rate, neither winners nor losers of risky
bets need be taxed on the risky portion of the investment. If rates are
progressive, however, two results arise: first, the winner pays a higher rate
of tax on income because it places them in a higher tax bracket, and sec-
ond (and perhaps more importantly) the loser's deduction is worth less
because it places them in a lower tax bracket. 154 This is particularly
troubling in the case of the implicit subsidy, because the sole reason for
the investor to engage in the derivative in the first place is the imposition
of an income tax. To the extent any taxpayers utilize derivative contracts
to mitigate the income tax, this incremental risk is being imposed solely
due to the government's decision to impose an income tax on risk, and
thus should (at a minimum) be taken into account in crafting a normative
response.155
The issue, therefore, becomes to what extent investors actually increase
their exposure to risky assets in response to an income tax in the real
world. At first glance, this question may appear fatal to the applicability
of the implicit subsidy in the real world, since mass increases in invest-
ment in risky assets by individuals, as predicted by the model, have not
been observed.156 It is possible, however, that this can be attributed not
to the fact that people do not adjust portfolios in response to tax, but
rather that the changes in the investment profile predicted in the model
154. See Weisbach, supra note 4, at 40-41.
Presumably, those in favor of progressivity and redistribution would oppose
such a system[;] ... those who lose their bets would be much happier with a
flat or regressively graduated rate schedule than a progressively graduated
rate schedule .... If our goal is to help those who lose their bets, it is hard to
see why we would want graduated rates.
Id. This position has been criticized on the basis that it assumes a flat normative tax rate,
while assuming a starting position of a graduated rate would not necessarily have the same
implication. See Zelenak, supra note 7, at 906-07.
155. See id. at 908-09.
156. See James R. Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity: A New Paradigm in Tax Eq-
uity, 61 VAND. L. REV. 1129, 1171 (2008) ("There is no evidence that investors employ the
portfolio adjustment technique described above. None of the portfolio managers for hedge
funds and mutual funds to whom I have spoken take advantage of this opportunity by
grossing up their investments.").
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would result only from changes in a tax system-the larger the change,
the larger the adjustments.1 57 Under a stable income tax system, inves-
tors do not rebalance their investments but rather simply purchase risky
assets on an after-tax basis. Economically, however, this is the same as if
they entered into two transactions: first, determining an ideal exposure to
risk absent an income tax, and second, adjusting portfolios to reflect tax
rates. 158 It is therefore possible to argue that portfolio adjustments do
occur, but that they are merely embedded in the after-tax calculation of
investors. As a result, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to empiri-
cally identify portfolio responses to the income taxation of risk in a rela-
tively stable situation.159 It intuitively makes sense that investors take
taxes into account in determining their investments, however, and it is
difficult to identify any theoretical reason to the contrary.1 60
Thus, assuming investors acquire risky assets on an after-tax basis, de-
mand for risky assets in a world with an income tax would be higher than
demand for risky assets in a world without an income tax.161 Taking into
consideration the transaction costs of acquiring risky assets in the real
world, the assumption of increased demand for derivatives seems reason-
able as well. 162 To the extent that increased demand for risky assets shifts
to the derivatives market, the price of the risky asset will not increase,
reducing nominal prices on the risky assets. Consequently, not only
would investors in the derivatives market bear the cost of the implicit
subsidy through their derivative contracts, but all investors in risky assets
could bear some of the implicit subsidy through reduced prices as well. 163
B. How TAXPAYERS CAN SUBSIDIZE SPECULATORS
IN THE REAL WORLD
Even taking the distributional malfunction as a given, the subsidization
of liquidity providers by investors in risky assets in the real world may not
trouble some, since it only impacts those who invest in risky assets in the
first place. Perhaps more troubling, however, is the possibility that tax-
157. See Weisbach, supra note 4, at 43-44.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 45-46.
160. See id. at 44.
161. See Terrence R. Chorvat, Apologia for the Double Taxation of Corporate Income,
38 WAKE FoREsT L. REV. 239, 263 (2003) ("The income tax has forced the investor to have
a portfolio that is riskier on a pre-tax basis. Hence, while the private risk to the investor
has not changed, total risk undertaken by society has. It is the government that bears the
additional risk."). This assumes that the government does not rebalance its risk into the
market, which would be the case in a world with the market signal malfunction.
162. See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text.
163. This is because the government bears default risk but the benefit of the govern-
ment bearing such risk would not be fully reflected in the price of the underlying asset.
This result holds to the extent the government bears the risk; to the extent the government
offsets the risk in the market, the system returns to equilibrium. Due to the market signal
malfunction, however, the government will bear some default risk and the full price benefit
of the government's risk-bearing will not be reflected in the market price of the risky asset.
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payers more generally, regardless whether they invest in risky assets,
could bear some of the costs of the implicit subsidy.
Under the general equilibrium model, it was assumed that the govern-
ment would rebalance its investment portfolio to the extent there was a
market signal that the government was bearing an undue amount of risk
after the imposition of a tax. In reality, however, the government does
not short individual stocks en masse in the market. It has been argued
that, rather than disprove the theory, this could mean simply that the
government prefers the risk exposure through the income tax, and thus
would only rebalance if it were to adopt a non-income tax.164 This may
make sense if the government was willing to make revenue contingent on
systemic risk of the economy as a whole, since a broad-based income tax
would be the equivalent of a diversified domestic portfolio. It becomes
less persuasive in the case when a "new" idiosyncratic risk (that is, specu-
lator default risk) is introduced into the system. In such a case, even if
the government preferred exposure to systemic risk, it might not prefer
exposure to this new idiosyncratic risk. This concern is magnified to the
extent of the market signal malfunction, since the government cannot
even determine that it is bearing such risk solely through market price
fluctuations, let alone decide whether it would prefer to do so.
The extent and amount of the risk borne by the government depends
solely on the amount of unpriced credit risk embedded in derivative con-
tracts traded on the liquid derivatives market. 165 Assuming the amount
of risk is non-negligible, it is a net cost of an income tax with relaxed
assumptions to introduce a liquid derivatives market that has not yet
been taken into account in the literature. Given the experience of Vol-
ume Investors in 1985, the stock market crash of 1987, the currency and
debt crisis of 1998, and the most recent "credit crunch," it is presumably a
safe assumption that such risk is at a minimum non-negligible. 1
66
In the real world, with respect to the government, disallowing loss de-
ductions may help offset some of this assumed non-diversifiable risk by
raising additional revenue. Any such benefit would be achieved only in a
very rough manner, however, since the benefit to the government would
be the risk-adjusted present value of the original risky asset losing, which
is likely different than the risk-adjusted present value of the default risk
164. See Weisbach, supra note 4, at 52.
165. Since this information is private and is built into the models utilized by hedge
funds to dynamically hedge their derivative positions, the present value of such risk is
currently not subject to accurate measurement. It is thus unclear to what extent this im-
pacts the present value of the risk borne by the government. Even if such risk could be
measured, however, that would impact only the scope of the response and not the presence
of the problem.
166. See, e.g., IMF HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 8, at 50 ("One of the lessons from
the failure of LTCM is that liquidity can disappear quickly during periods of market stress
. .. " .
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assumed by the government. 167 In addition, loss limitations would place
the government in the unusual position of being better off from a revenue
perspective when risky assets lose. Thus, not only would loss limitations
harm precisely the taxpayers who engaged in derivatives solely in re-
sponse to the imposition of an income tax in the first place, it would also
create perverse incentives as between the government and investors more
generally.
Even if this was not troubling from a normative perspective, loss limita-
tions would do nothing to offset the sub-optimal over-supply of liquidity
providers in the market, as compared to the no-tax world, since they
would do nothing to change the market signal malfunction. Further, as
discussed below, any such means of raising revenue would also presuma-
bly be less efficient than allocating the cost to other less elastic tax bases
(including, as discussed below, by doing nothing and allowing the cost to
be borne by investors and taxpayers as a whole). In this manner, adopt-
ing an income tax that limits or disallows loss deductions in a world with
imperfect financial markets could serve to exacerbate the distributional
malfunction as between investors and liquidity providers without solving
the market signal malfunction. Similar analyses hold for progressive rates
and realization.
Even more troubling, the subsidy arises from liquidity providers enter-
ing into derivative contracts with United States taxpayers as counterpar-
ties, regardless of whether the liquidity provider itself is subject to United
States tax. In particular, offshore hedge funds (not subject to United
States tax) exacerbate the distributional malfunction, since not only can
they default upon a loss, but the government does not share in the-win-
ning bets of the hedge fund if the fund is not subject to United States tax.
That a number of liquidity providers are established offshore and do not
pay United States net income tax serves only to increase the detrimental
cost of the implicit subsidy.
Further, where the derivative is traded is irrelevant to the analysis. For
example, a United States taxpayer trading derivatives on a London or
Tokyo exchange would not necessarily avoid the problem, because the
United States taxpayer would be subject to the United States income tax
on such investments. As a result, the imposition of an income tax would
create demand for such derivatives, thus subjecting the taxpayer to the
distributional malfunction to the extent the taxpayer bore unpriced de-
fault risk through the operation of the market.
Since the market does not return to equilibrium, someone in the sys-
tem must not return to the optimal investment position they were in prior
to the introduction of the income tax. There are two costs being borne:
(1) the investment risk assumed by the government, and (2) the specula-
tive risk being transferred to the derivative investor. With respect to (2),
167. See Schenk, supra note 150, at 430 ("Even assuming we wanted to impose a tax
burden on the return to risk, doing so by adding loss limitation rules to a normative income
tax is a remarkably inefficient and inequitable way to do so.").
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the distributive malfunction may impact overall utility-depending on the
relative utility curves of the investor and the counterparty-but should
not impact the market price of the underlying asset, and thus would not
need to be taken into account to achieve equilibrium (although norma-
tive considerations may require some response). 168
With respect to (1), however, the simplest and most apparent response
of the government would be to raise revenue to offset market losses as
they occur through the imposition of an incremental tax on a non-risk
based return. Under optimal tax theory, the base for this tax should be
the base with the lowest relative marginal elasticities (of labor in the case
of an income tax, or of consumption in the case of a commodity or other
consumption tax), so that the incremental tax would result in the least
distortion to the utility maximizing decision-making process. 169 Presuma-
bly, the lowest marginal elastic base in the current United States tax sys-
tem would be some component of the domestic labor-wage base, and
most likely the non-information based (and thus less mobile) labor-wage
base.170 In more colloquial terms, the government could tax Main Street
to pay Wall Street. 171 Assuming this is the case, solely through the impo-
sition of an income tax on risk in a world with a liquid derivatives market,
absent any other changes, the domestic labor wage base could be forced
to incur a greater tax burden to the extent the government bears specula-
tor default risk through the imposition of an income tax.
Of course, raising taxes is not the only option available to the govern-
ment. Rather than raise taxes, the government could print money to pay
the obligation, which would result in large increases in the money supply
and thus significant inflation-effectively a tax on all consumption.'7 2
Another option would be for the government to borrow to fund the
shortfall, which would merely shift the burden onto future taxpayers.' 7 3
168. See Zelenak, supra note 7, at 895-896.
169. See generally RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE
IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (4th ed. 1984).
170. For a discussion of the relative mobility of labor classes, see David S. Law, Global-
ization and the Future of Constitutional Rights, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1277, 1323-42 (2008).
171. For an example in a different context, see David Stout, The Wall Street Bailout
Plan, Explained, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008, at A32 ("[Y]ou could argue that people who
cannot tell soybean futures from puts, calls and options are being asked to clean up the
costly mess left by Wall Street.").
172. Inflation due to the government printing money in response to obligations acts as a
form of implicit tax on all domestic consumption through increased prices based on rela-
tive elasticities of demand for various goods and services in the economy. See Weisbach,
supra note 4, at 54 n.110 ("The government could attempt to pay off the debt by printing
money, but the resulting inflation would be equivalent to a tax change."). The allocation of
this cost throughout the entire domestic consumption economy would likely be more dis-
tortive, and thus less efficient, than explicitly allocating this cost onto a single low elasticity
base, such as the domestic labor wage base, although it is ultimately an empirical question.
173. Alternatively, the government could borrow, not as a means to shift the obligation
intergenerationally, but rather as a means to redistribute the risk into the market. See
Weisbach, supra note 4, at 53-54. Weisbach states:
Borrowing can shift tax receipts across periods, but in the long run, govern-
ment inflows must equal outlays .... Because the government budget must
be in long-term balance, this state of affairs is not an equilibrium. If the new
2009]
SMU LAW REVIEW
Regardless of which alternative the government turns to, however, the
implicit subsidy problem remains; the only difference would be upon
which base the costs would be shifted. As a result, to the extent the gov-
ernment bears default risk of speculators through the imposition of an
income tax, some other base must subsidize it, at least as compared to the
no-tax world.
This result, combined with the distributional malfunction, can result in
a subsidy to speculators at the expense of investors in risky assets, and
potentially of all taxpayers. Not only does this raise normative distribu-
tional concerns, but as compared to the no-tax world, such a subsidy
could also lead to a sub-optimal over-supply of speculators in the market.
By the government assuming some of the risks of speculation through the
income tax, the present value of speculation would be increased, poten-
tially contributing to overspeculation and thus excessive risks in the fi-
nancial markets, leading to periodic "crunches" of liquidity in the
financial markets as well.
V. RETHINKING THE ROLE OF A MODERN INCOME TAX IN
A WORLD WITH IMPERFECT FINANCIAL MARKETS
Once the taxation of speculators and financial markets is analyzed
from the perspective of implicit subsidy, a very different approach to con-
ceptualizing their tax treatment arises as well, because even assuming no
timing, rate, or character benefit to speculators, speculators may still be
subsidized through the imposition of an income tax. Any normative ap-
proach to the taxation of financial markets that starts with an ideal in-
come tax model must therefore start with remedying this distortion
before addressing the complications which arise from timing, rate, and
character differentials. Maximizing the optimality of the taxation of fi-
nancial markets in this manner can permit a better understanding of how
to craft an optimal response to the threat of imperfect financial markets
and financial speculators in the real world. 174
tax regime is to remain and if spending is to remain fixed, the government
must adjust its portfolio to maintain budget balance. A pure "no adjustment"
position is unsustainable .... Borrowing should not change this result....
The borrowing ... would be equivalent to selling the risky asset short. The
reason why is that ... [t]he debt is entirely dependent on risky flows. It is
effectively equity that the government has sold short, just as the model re-
quires. If the underlying flows are risky, borrowing will be risky. Borrowing,
therefore, cannot change the basic equivalences and the need for some type
of adjustments when tax regimes change.
Id. In reality, it is unlikely that the United States government would default on debt solely
to allocate its share of default risk assumed through the imposition of an income tax into
the market, since a default in United States debt would likely result in a much greater
financial instability to the economy as a whole than the cost of the government bearing the
risk in the first place.
174. For example, the income tax literature has identified hedge funds as a potential
challenge to the viability of the income tax regime, particularly the international income
tax regime. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz & Itai Grinberg, Taxing International Portfolio
Income, 56 TAX L. REv. 537, 584-85 (2003); Vito Tanzi, Globalization, Technological De-
velopments, and the Work of Fiscal Termites, 26 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1261, 1272-73 (2001).
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A. SAVING THE INCOME TAX WITH A DERIVATIVE TRADING TAX17 5
Through the imposition of an income tax, the government may bear the
cost of default risk due to taxpayers utilizing liquid derivatives markets to
mitigate the income taxation of risky assets. What lessons can this pro-
vide to the debate over the current income tax?
Assuming the implicit subsidy results in an over-supply of liquidity
providers as compared to the no-tax world, and a corresponding change
in market equilibrium, one solution to return to the no-tax equilibrium
would be for the government to internalize the cost of such subsidy to the
liquidity providers themselves, mitigating the distortions to the deriva-
tives market. The difficulty with such an approach is two-fold: (1) the
government would have to calculate the default risk of each particular
liquidity provider, and (2) the government would have to identify liquid-
ity provider counterparties as opposed to hedging investors or other non-
speculative investors.
Even assuming the feasibility of such undertakings (for example, if
there was a mandatory information reporting regime for speculators and
full compliance), which is unlikely, both of these requirements would im-
pose significant administrative costs both on the government and on the
liquidity providers themselves. As a result, there is no way to guarantee
that such an approach would be a better second-best solution than the
current implicit subsidy, especially given the liquidity and risk allocation
function that liquidity providers play more generally in the economy. 176
This concern only grows as the feasibility of such an approach decreases
in light of proprietary trading information and lack of financial disclosure
existent in the modern financial community.
If an income tax specifically on liquidity providers to internalize the
costs of the government subsidy of risk was not possible, alternatively, the
government could impose higher marginal tax rates on derivatives more
generally as compared to other financial assets such as stocks or bonds.
This would result in liquidity providers paying a higher amount of tax on
their derivative investments, reducing the yield on their speculative in-
vestments and thus mitigating the implicit subsidy. The problem is that
such an approach would be both over- and under-inclusive, since deriva-
tives entered into by hedging investors (which do not raise the same con-
cern as derivatives entered into by speculators) would also be subject to
the increased marginal tax rate. 77 Perhaps more importantly, an in-
crease in the income taxation of derivatives could lead to a perverse in-
centive serving only to exacerbate the subsidy cycle rather than mitigate
175. This heading is a variation of the title of Professor Schenk's influential article,
Saving the Income Tax with a Wealth Tax. See Schenk, supra note 150.
176. The theory of second-best provides that incremental movements towards an ideal
can actually be sub-optimal from an overall welfare standpoint if at least one variable is
constrained. See generally R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General Theory of Sec-
ond Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956).
177. Such a policy would also allow manipulation of this difference in rate by taxpayers
at the expense of the government. See, e.g., Schizer, supra note 17, at 1897-99.
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it: an increase in the income tax could lead to an increase in demand for
derivatives under Domar-Musgrave to mitigate the incremental income
tax, in turn increasing the demand for liquidity providers and thus in-
creasing the default risk in the market.
Since an income tax directly on liquidity providers may not be feasible,
and increased marginal income tax rates on derivatives traded on the liq-
uid market may cause other problems that would outweigh their marginal
benefit, perhaps the government should consider adopting a policy simi-
lar to that already embedded in the derivatives market by the actors in
the market themselves. As discussed above, the liquid derivatives mar-
kets adopted clearinghouses, margin, netting, and mark-to-market on
their own as means to prevent pure risk gambling speculators from bring-
ing undue default risk into the liquid market. These measures served to
make it prohibitive for pure gambling speculators to trade on the liquid
derivatives market, but at the cost of a small increase in the relative price
of each derivative traded on the market. Presumably, since the market
was willing to tolerate an increased price on each derivative trade as a
means to minimize default risk in the market, a similar solution could be
appropriate for the increased default risk arising from the income taxa-
tion of risk as well.
Along these lines, two alternatives would be possible. 178 The first
would be to adopt a mandatory self-insurance fund for speculators enter-
ing into derivative contracts on a liquid exchange, similar to funds such as
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. 79 In essence, the mandatory
self-insurance would act as an incremental margin requirement for liquid-
ity providers, which would protect investors as a whole from default of
any one large speculator. Such a proposal could address the distribu-
tional malfunction by internalizing the cost of potential default to large
derivative counterparties and protecting smaller investors from such de-
faults. A problem with such an approach, however, is that it does not
necessarily address the market signal malfunction, since it would be unre-
lated to the price of the underlying asset and would not raise any revenue
for the government to offset its sub-optimal risk position. Further, as
with other proposals, it would be both over- and under-inclusive in that it
would be difficult to apply solely to liquidity providers and not to other
derivative counterparties, such as hedging investors. Thus, although such
178. A third, significantly different, alternative would also be available: to replace the
income tax with a cash-flow consumption tax. This would exempt taxation on the risky
portion of assets but maintain the tax burden on risk-free and inframarginal returns. See,
e.g., Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal Consumption Tax
Over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1413, 1417 (2006). This Article assumes a
normative income tax and thus does not address the larger choice of tax base debate, al-
though the lessons learned from this model could be relevant to that debate as well. See,
e.g., William J. Turnier, Theory Meets Reality: The Case of the Double Tax on Material
Capital, 27 VA. TAX REV. 83, 83 (2007).
179. See, e.g., David A. Moss, Risk, Responsibility, and the Role of Government, 56
DRAKE L. REV. 541 (2008). I am indebted to the participants of the Loyola L.A. Law
School Tax Colloquium for this suggestion.
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a proposal might be useful, and even appropriate for non-tax reasons, it
would not be sufficient to fully address the implicit subsidy.
Second, the government could impose a tax on the entering into, and
each trade of, a derivatives contract on the liquid market (a "derivatives
trading tax") in response to the implicit subsidization of liquidity provider
default risk. This is not necessarily a radical idea; in fact every president
from Ronald Reagan to George W. Bush has proposed some sort of tax
or fee on futures trading.180 The difference is that, for the first time, the
trading tax would be introduced to make the income tax more equitable
and efficient, rather than to offset inefficiencies in the securities markets,
raise revenue, or accomplish other separate goals.
In many ways, this similar to prior proposals for a Securities Transac-
tions Excise Tax (STET), which, among other iterations, proposed a 0.5%
excise tax on the trading of all publicly traded securities.181 The STET
was initially proposed as a means of reducing excess volatility on securi-
ties markets arising from the proliferation of day-traders and other specu-
lators. 182 The underlying theory was that the volatility caused by
speculators outweighed the liquidity benefits of their presence on the
markets, and thus a STET could lead to a more efficient market by in-
creasing the cost of speculation, while at the same time raising revenue
for the government. 183 This conclusion faced strong opposition by others
who claimed that the liquidity benefits outweighed any volatility con-
cerns, and thus that a STET would do more harm than good. 184
Unlike a STET, the derivatives trading tax proposal would not be in-
tended to correct a market failure such as excess volatility, but rather to
correct a distortion in financial markets caused by the imposition of an
income tax. From this perspective, prior efficiency analyses of the impact
of a STET on financial markets which did not take into account the im-
plicit subsidy would not directly address the issue of the efficiency of a
derivatives trading tax in a world with the implicit subsidy. Taken from
180. See Mark Jickling, Cong. Research Serv., Proposed Transaction Fee on Futures
Contracts (2006), available at www.nationalaglawcenter.org/assets/crs/RS22415.pdf (last
visited Jan. 21, 2009). For example, the first Bush Administration proposed fees ranging
from 11 cents to 15 cents, while the Clinton Administration proposed a fee of 14 cents, on
futures trading. See Craig S. Hakkio, Should We Throw Sand in the Gears of Financial
Markets?, 79 ECON. REV. 17, 18 (1994). Further, this idea has begun to receive renewed
interest in light of the credit crunch. See, e.g., Bob Herbert, Where the Money Is, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 13, 2009, at A25.
181. See, e.g., R. Glenn Hubbard, Securities Transactions Taxes: Tax Design, Revenue,
and Policy Considerations, 61 TAX NoTs 985, 986 (1993); Scott W. MacCormack, A Cri-
tique of the Reemerging Securities Transfer Excise Tax, 44 TAX LAW. 927, 927 (1991).
182. See Lawrence H. Summers & Victoria P. Summers, When Financial Markets Work
Too Well: A Cautious Case for a Securities Transactions Tax, 3 J. FIN. SERVS. RESEARCI 1
261, 268-69 (1989); Joseph E. Stiglitz, Using Tax Policy to Curb Speculative Short-Term
Trading, 3 J. FIN. SERVS. RESEARCH 101, 110-15 (1989).
183. See Summers & Summers, supra note 182, at 285; Stiglitz, supra note 182, at 113.
184. See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 100TH CONG., DESCRIPTION OF
POSSIBLE OPTONS TO INCREASE REVENUES PREPARED FOR THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS
AND MEANS 82 (Comm. Print 1987); Tamar Frankel, What Can Be Done About Stock Mar-
ket Volatility?, 69 B.U. L. REV. 991, 995 (1989); Hubbard, supra note 181, at 989-90.
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this perspective, the derivatives trading tax could be a more efficient solu-
tion to the implicit subsidy than allocating the burden to other income tax
bases, such as the labor-wage base or the consumption base, because it
would serve as a cost on the provision of liquidity to the market rather
than on the gains derived from doing so, by taxing the number of trades
rather than the fortune of winning on risky bets.
As with the STET, one concern with a derivatives trading tax could be
that it would unintentionally fall on individuals and retirement funds
rather than speculators.' 85 The derivatives trading tax would be less
problematic in this respect, in part because a STET was designed to fall
on both derivatives and financial assets such as stocks and bonds. Unlike
investors in stocks and bonds, speculators are required to engage in larger
number of trades on the liquid derivatives market, either to act as liquid-
ity providers or to reallocate their speculative bets as the risk moves over
time through dynamic hedging. By limiting the transaction tax to the liq-
uid derivatives market, trades by investors or retirement funds in finan-
cial assets such as stocks or bonds would not be subject to this tax;18 6
conversely, since the business model of liquidity providers is to provide
liquidity to financial markets, investing in underlying financial assets as a
means of avoiding the tax would not be available to them.187 This fact
alone could favor adoption of a derivatives trading tax as compared to
the STET.188
This tax would also avoid most of the information and administrative
costs of other proposals, such as an income tax on or mandatory self-
insurance fund for liquidity providers. First, it would be relatively easy to
impose and collect;18 9 given that clearinghouses already serve as a center
for pooling of derivative trading and margin accounts and by necessity
know the number of trades and parties involved in each trade, the
clearinghouse could easily serve as collection agent for such a tax. Fur-
ther, clearinghouses acting as collection agents would not bear any risk
185. See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 181, at 992-93.
186. If retirement funds were a particular concern, trades entered into by pension
funds, IRAs, and 401(k) accounts could be exempted from the tax, although this would add
complexity and some potential for abuse.
187. Applying a STET exclusively to futures markets has been considered in the past
and has been criticized primarily on the liquidity/volatility analysis and on the international
competitiveness analysis. See Franklin R. Edwards, Taxing Transactions in Futures Mar-
kets: Objectives and Effects, 7 J. FINANCE SERVS. RESEARCH 75, 77-78, 83-86 (1992). Since
the purpose of the derivatives trading tax would be precisely to internalize the costs of
trading on speculators in derivatives due to the implicit subsidy, this criticism is less rele-
vant to the derivatives trading tax than the STET.
188. Further, some studies suggest it is possible in certain circumstances that a trading
tax could actually be Pareto improving. This would tend to be the case in a situation where
the income tax creates distortions in demand for speculative derivative counterparties, fur-
ther supporting a derivatives trading tax in this context. See James Dow & Rohit Rahi,
Should Speculators Be Taxed?, 73 J. Bus. 89, 89-90 (2000); Frank M. Song & Junxi Zhang,
Securities Transaction Tax and Market Volatility, 115 ECON. J. 1103, 1103 (2005).
189. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES,
A FUTURES TRANSACTION FEE Is ADMINISTRATIVELY FEASIBLE (1993), available at http://
archive.gao.gov/t2pbat5/150186.pdf.
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on the payment of the tax itself, since they would have access to sufficient
cash to remit the tax through claims on the speculator's margin accounts.
Unlike an income or excise tax on or a mandatory self-insurance fund for
liquidity providers, a derivatives trading tax would not require the gov-
ernment to expend resources in identifying which derivative investors
were entering into transactions as liquidity providers as opposed to other
investors. Rather, the tax would be imposed solely on the entering into
of the trade, a purely objective and readily obtainable measure.
Although a derivatives trading tax has many benefits, the primary ob-
stacle with this approach would be setting the optimal rate. Any rate in
excess of the optimal rate would deter the entering into derivative con-
tracts and could result in less efficient risk allocation in the economy as a
whole. A rate lower than the optimal rate would mitigate the market-
signal and distributional malfunctions, but would not completely alleviate
it. Since the information on the amount of default risk borne by taxpay-
ers and the government is proprietary to the liquidity providers, 190 any
rate would be, at best, an educated guess and, at worst, arbitrary, and
thus potentially sub-optimal even as compared to the current tax re-
gime. 191 Regardless, a first step could, and should, be the imposition of a
low-level derivatives trading tax, which, at a minimum, would raise some
revenue to offset the sub-optimal risk position of the government in a
more efficient and equitable manner than disallowing losses or increasing
tax rates on derivative instruments themselves. Based on previous stud-
ies related to the STET, a rate lower than 0.5%, or a fixed amount less
than ten cents per trade, could be low enough to avoid significantly dis-
torting the derivatives market while partially offsetting the implicit sub-
sidy, although further theoretical and empirical work would need to be
done to calibrate the final specific rate.192
Perhaps more importantly, however, the derivative trading tax would
increase the incentive to trade on other markets not subject to the tax.
One option would be for speculators to enter into derivatives on non-
liquid markets or directly in underlying financial assets, each of which
would increase transaction costs but decrease the implicit subsidy, which
is precisely the intended effect. More concerning, however, the tax would
only be effective to the extent investors did not have an alternative non-
United States market on which to enter into the derivative. If such alter-
natives did exist and the cost of the tax exceeded the sum of the incre-
mental benefit of a United States liquid exchange plus the incremental
transaction costs of executing such trades on a market outside of the
190. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
191. This represents a classic second-best problem. See Lipsey & Lancaster, supra note
176, at 11. Regulatory means to increase pricing information might ameliorate, but not
solve, this tax problem, although the costs and benefits of such a solution would require an
analysis of much more than just the tax impact. See, e.g., Paredes, supra note 14, at 1034-
35.
192. Recent proposals for a futures contract user fee have set the fee at a fixed amount
of $.07 per trade, which is a fraction of the $.50 per trade fee charged by clearinghouses.
See Jickling, supra note 180, at 2.
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United States, speculators would have an incentive to trade on such ex-
changes in response to the imposition of the trading tax.193 This was of
particular concern at the time the STET was being considered. 194
This is less of a concern with the derivatives trading tax, however, since
the business model of liquidity providers is to act as open counterparties
to risk. To profit from this business model, the liquidity provider must
provide liquidity to those markets seeking liquidity, and thus would not
profit from similar trades on other markets not in need of such liquidity.
Nonetheless, this concern remains even in the context of liquidity provid-
ers to the extent the trading tax would exceed the sum of the profit from
providing liquidity to United States liquid derivatives markets plus the
transaction costs of trading elsewhere.
Further, once an open system is taken into account, the possibility of
liquidity providers forming offshore so as not to be subject to the tax
regime of the United States must also be taken into account. With re-
spect to the trading tax, this would not be problematic because the tax
would be on each trade on a domestic exchange regardless where the
counterparty is organized. As discussed above, however, the implicit
subsidy would be exacerbated because it is the investor who is in the
involuntary partnership with the government, notwithstanding that the
counterparty is not subject to the United States tax laws. In this man-
ner, the liquidity provider could enjoy the benefit of the implicit subsidy
without having to incur the cost of paying an income tax on the gains
earned from doing so,195 only increasing the benefit of the implicit
subsidy. 196 As a result, the derivatives trading tax would cease to be ef-
fective, notwithstanding that the speculator would still be subject to it,
because the benefits of the implicit subsidy would have exceeded the cost
of the tax.
193. See, e.g., Jerry W. Markham, Super Regulator: A Comparative Analysis of Securi-
ties and Derivatives Regulation in the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan, 28 BROOK.
J. INT'L L. 319, 367-68 (2003) ("Competition from abroad was also posing a major threat to
the dominance of the American futures and options markets.").
194. See, e.g., John Campbell & Kenneth Froot, International Experiences with Securi-
ties Transaction Taxes, in THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF EQUITY MARKETS, (Jeffrey A.
Frankel ed., 1994).
195. In some ways, this issue may seem reminiscent of a more traditional "moral haz-
ard" concern, in which the ex post actions of the government could lead to excessively risky
behavior in the market. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, Too Big to Fail: Moral Haz-
ard in Auditing and the Need to Restructure the Industry Before it Unravels, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1698, 1698 (2006); Henry T. C. Hu, Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government
Neutrality, 78 TEX. L. REV. 777, 865-72 (2000) (discussing the moral hazard issue in the
context of the Federal Reserve-led bailout of LTCM). The issue of decision-making distor-
tions in an income tax may share some similarities to the moral hazard issue, but they are
conceptually distinct. As a result, the scope of a legal or regulatory response to moral
hazard concerns for hedge funds, if any, is beyond the scope of this Article. See, e.g.,
Kambhu et al., supra note 70.
196. This phenomenon is similar to that of "divergence" in the area of international tax,
where one country bears an undue amount of risk on a risk-based return due to the failure
of the international tax rules to balance the taxation of gains with losses on the risky asset.
See Mitchell A. Kane, Risk and Redistribution in Open and Closed Economies, 92 VA. L.
REV. 867, 870-71 (2006).
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The combination of these two problems demonstrates the biggest prob-
lem with a stand-alone transactions tax, such as the derivatives trading
tax, as a comprehensive solution to the implicit subsidy: the potential spi-
raling effect. The ability of liquidity providers to operate offshore, and
thus avoid paying income tax, would increase the revenue needs of the
government. The derivatives trading tax could serve to mitigate this to
some extent, since the tax would be on the privilege of trading derivatives
on a liquid market within the United States regardless whether the inves-
tor was subject to United States income taxation. As compared to the
closed model, however, the rate of a derivatives trading tax would have to
be significantly higher to compensate the government for the increasing
loss of revenue as the income of liquidity providers escapes income taxa-
tion. In this manner, the adoption of a derivatives trading tax could result
in a spiral in which the liquidity providers would have increasing incen-
tives to move offshore to avoid the income tax as a means of compensat-
ing for paying the trading tax, which would require an increasingly large
trading tax to compensate for the loss in revenue, resulting in further in-
creases in the incentive of liquidity providers to locate and trade offshore.
A spiraling trading tax itself could lead to a form of tax competition
among countries where other countries would be willing to charge a
lower (or no) trading tax for trades made on a liquid exchange located in
such a country. This could lead to a downward spiral in the viability of
the United States liquid exchange itself; as liquidity providers ceased
trading on United States liquid exchanges, the exchanges would become
less liquid and thus less attractive to new investors.1 97
Both of these considerations (that is, the incentive to locate offshore
and the incentive to trade offshore) lead to the conclusion that a deriva-
tives trading tax would unlikely be a stable stand-alone solution in a mod-
ern financial world. 198 Unlike with the STET, however, this problem
could be overcome in the case of the derivatives trading tax precisely
because it is intended to serve not as a stand-alone tax but rather as an
integral part of the income tax. Consequently, it would become necessary
to not only adopt the derivatives trading tax, but also to reconsider the
income taxation of offshore speculators as well. In particular, in connec-
tion with adopting a derivatives trading tax, the United States would need
to reconsider the extraterritorial reach of its income tax regime so as to
avoid the pricing spiral effect. Among other possibilities, the United
States could extend the reach of its net income tax on the income of off-
shore speculators, impose a withholding tax on gain from derivatives
traded in the United States, or impose an "exit tax" on speculators that
197. Ironically, at the same time, to the extent United States taxpayers enter into deriv-
atives on foreign exchanges, the United States government would continue to subsidize the
speculative risk-taking of the liquidity providers regardless on which exchange the deriva-
tive was traded.
198. This concern, in part, led to the downfall of the STET proposals. See supra note
194 and accompanying text.
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leave the country, 199 reducing the spiraling pressure on the derivatives
trading tax. In this way, the derivatives trading tax and the international
income tax could work together to form a more equitable and efficient
overall tax regime in a modern financial world than either tax standing
alone. 200
The issues to consider in this respect would include a rethinking of
what it means to be engaged in the business of trading securities in the
United States,20 1 the ability of investors to defer income generated by
hedge funds, the character and tax rate of income generated by hedge
funds, the taxation of "tax exempt" investors investing in hedge funds,202
and the treatment of the carried interest compensation of the manag-
ers.20 3 All of these considerations would have to balance the implicit risk
subsidy for liquid exchange-traded derivatives with the impact on United
States investors, as compared to investors from other countries undertak-
ing similar business models. 20 4
199. Each of these represents a portion of the current international taxation rules of the
United States. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §882(a) (tax on U.S. business income of foreign corpora-
tions), 26 U.S.C. §§951(a) (current inclusion by U.S. persons of certain income earned
outside the United States), 26 U.S.C. §§871, 881 (withholding tax on certain U.S. source
income), 26 U.S.C. §367(a) (exit tax on certain outbound corporate transactions), 26 U.S.C
§877 (exit tax on certain expatriating citizens); see generally CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON ET
AL., TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS (3d ed. 2006).
200. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Three Goals of Taxation, 60 TAX L. REV. 1, 21
(2006) ("Globalization and tax competition for capital also introduce their own limitations
on taxing capital too highly .... Thus, a different kind of tax is needed in addition to the
income tax.").
201. See, e.g., Alex Raskolnikov, The Cost of Norms: Tax Effects of Tacit Understand-
ings, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 601, 618 (2007) (discussing the rise of "season and sell" transac-
tions by hedge funds as informal responses to tax rules); Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis:
Neither a Dealer nor a Lender Be, Part 2: Hedge Fund Lending, 108 TAX NOTES 729, 730
(2005).
202. See Lee A. Sheppard & Martin A. Sullivan, Offshore Explorations: Caribbean
Hedge Funds, Part 1, 118 TAX NOTES, 95, 95-96 (2008); David A. Stein, UBIT Issues in
Investment Partnerships: What Tax-Exempt Organizations (and Their Taxable Partners)
Should Know, 756 PLI/TAx 453, 459-60 (2007); see generally Summer Ayers LePree, Taxa-
tion of US Tax-Exempt Entities' Offshore Hedge Fund Investments-Application of the Sec-
tion 514 Debt-Financed Rules to Leveraged Hedge Funds and Derivatives and the Case for
Equalization, 61 TAX LAW. 807 (2008)
203. Because of the nature of liquidity provision and the offshore structure (whether
through a master-feeder structure or otherwise) utilized by many hedge funds, the benefits
of long-term capital gain are much less problematic for hedge funds than for private equity
funds, although deferral may be a stronger concern for hedge funds. See generally STAFF
OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 110m CONG., PRESENT LAW AND ANALYSIS RELAT-
ING TO TAX TREATMENT OF PARTNERSHIP CARRIED INTERESTS (Comm. Print 2007) [here-
inafter JCT CARRIED INTEREST REPORT]. It is for this reason, among others, that the
debate surrounding the taxation of carried interest for private equity funds should be seg-
regated from the debate over the taxation of incentive fees for hedge funds. See generally
JCT CARRIED INTEREST REPORT, supra; Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partner-
ship Profits in Private Equity Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2008); Michael S. Knoll, The
Taxation of Carried Interests: Estimating the Revenue Effects of Taxing Profit Interests as
Ordinary Income, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 115 (2008); Chris William Sanchirico, Taxing
Carried Interest: The Problematic Analogy to "Sweat Equity," 117 TAX NOTES 239 (2007);
David A. Weisbach, The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94 VA. L. REV. 415
(2008).
204. See, e.g., IMF HEDGE FUND REPORT, supra note 8, at 57 ("[H]edge funds operate
across national and legal jurisdictions, so a reasonable level of cross-border cooperation
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Thus, even under a normative model, in which assumptions have been
relaxed solely to introduce the presence of traded derivatives, the taxa-
tion of modern financial derivatives markets and liquidity providers re-
quires a fundamental rethinking of how to balance the taxation of the
activities of financial speculators, the extraterritorial reach of the income
tax over the activities of financial speculators, and the rules applicable to
investors and managers of financial speculators. 20 5 Each of these issues
necessarily influences the others in unique ways when applied to the im-
plicit subsidy of hedge funds, and thus only under a comprehensive ap-
proach, in which all such considerations are balanced at the same time,
can any normative policy be crafted. 20 6 A number of these issues have
been considered in other contexts,20 7 but placed in the context of the im-
plicit subsidy to liquidity providers a more comprehensive cost-benefit
analysis can be undertaken.
The primary lesson that can be drawn from this analysis is the impor-
tance of shifting the debate regarding the taxation of financial speculators
from a focus on the income taxation of particular transactions to a more
comprehensive approach that takes into account the implicit subsidy to
liquidity provision as part of an overall reform of the income taxation of
financial speculators in a world with imperfect financial markets. Such
analysis will also necessarily become international in nature, not because
liquidity providers such as hedge funds happen to be located offshore, but
because any normative implications of the taxation and risk model would
necessarily implicate incentives to cross national borders in an open
model. Any response not taking into account both the implicit subsidy
and the international aspects at the same time would be incomplete.
would be required .... It is not clear that sufficient cooperation and coordination exists
today.").
205. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Col6n, Financial Products and Source Basis Taxation: U.S. In-
ternational Tax Policy at the Crossroads, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 775, 836-43.
206. See generally Avi-Yonah, supra note 200.
207. In particular, hedge fund issues are often included in debates regarding specific
financial products or structured transactions or debates regarding other private investment
funds, such as private equity or venture capital. See, e.g., David P. Hariton, When and How
Should the Economic Substance Doctrine be Applied, 60 TAX L. REV. 29, 50-53 (2006)
(analyzing the economic substance doctrine as applied to hedge funds); Charlene Davis
Luke, Beating the "Wrap": The Agency Effort to Control Wraparound Insurance Tax Shel-
ters, 25 VA. TAX REV. 129, 132-33 (2005) (analyzing hedge fund insurance "wrappers");
David S. Miller, Distinguishing Risk: The Disparate Tax Treatment of Insurance and Finan-
cial Contracts in a Converging Marketplace, 55 TAX LAW. 481, 540 (2002) (analyzing hedge
fund reinsurance companies); Deborah H. Schenk, An Efficiency Approach to Reforming a
Realization-Based Tax, 57 TAX L. REv. 503, 534 (2004) (analyzing the limitations of statu-
tory approaches to prevent the manipulation of timing and character in hedge funds under
the realization requirement). See also Jerald David August & Lawrence Cohen, Hedge
Funds-Structure, Regulation and Tax Implications, 756 PLI/TA 259, 263-64 (2007); Craig
W. Foxgrover, Offshore Hedge Funds, U.S. Banks, and Total Return Swaps: Finding a Path
Other Than the Trade or Business Standard for U.S. International Tax Policy to Take in the
World of Financial Derivatives (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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B. THE INCOME TAX IN A MODERN FINANCIAL WORLD: AN AGENDA
The lessons to be learned from the detailed examination of the income
taxation of modern financial derivatives markets could have application
well beyond the context of the taxation of financial speculators in deriva-
tive markets to the income tax system more generally. A growing body
of literature has increasingly demonstrated imperfections in the modern
financial markets, which cause their operations in the real world to depart
from predictions in the efficient markets hypothesis. 20 8 For example, the
Black-Scholes pricing model, which revolutionized option pricing meth-
odology and formed the basis of modern derivative markets,20 9 has right-
fully dominated the literature on the proper taxation of derivative
products.210 One problem with this approach in the taxation literature is
that it fails to recognize an open secret in the finance world- that Black-
Scholes is wrong, 211 or more specifically that at least one of the funda-
mental assumptions of the Black-Scholes model, constant volatility of the
underlying asset, has been empirically proven to a near certainty to be
incorrect in the operation of actual modern financial markets, at least
since the stock market crash of 1987.212
Taking this factor into account, under the approach outlined in this Ar-
ticle, the debate over the taxation of options and similar instruments such
as swaps would need to be reframed to account for the reasons that buy-
ers of liquid derivatives often pay significantly more or less for such de-
rivatives than the price predicted by Black-Scholes and the impact on the
government of this change in the risk-allocation mechanisms used in the
real world. To the extent that such pricing anomalies reflect structural
208. See Jonathan Ford, A Greedy Giant Out of Control, PROSPECT, Nov. 2008, at 152,
available at http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article-details.php?id=10443; Ron Bird,
Lorenzo Casavecchia & Paul Woolley, Insights into the Market Impact of Different Invest-
ment Styles (Paul Woolley Centre Working Paper, 2008), available at http://www.business.
uts.edu.au/qfrc/pwc/research/workingpapers/2008/wpl.pdf. See generally Burton G.
Malkiel, The Efficient Market Hypothesis and Its Critics, 17 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 59
(2003).
209. See Hu, supra note 15, at 1474-76.
210. See, e.g., Chason, supra note 52, at 138-39; David M. Hasen, A Realization-Based
Approach to the Taxation of Financial Instruments, 57 TAX L. REV. 397, 402 (2004).
211. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 15, at 1478.
212. The Black-Scholes formula relies on arbitrage-free pricing theory by taking into
account the factors relevant to the price of an option and then controlling for all variables
other than the price, including the volatility of the underlying asset. See supra note 37.
After the crash of 1987, finance theorists compiled empirical data on actual prices of op-
tions to insert into the formula to test the assumption regarding underlying asset volatility
by making it the variable in the equation - what resulted was a "skewed" volatility depend-
ing on the term of the option, among other factors. See generally NEFIrCI supra note 27.
This is sometimes referred to as the "volatility smile" due to the shape of the implied
volatility graph resulting from empirical pricing studies. See, e.g., Hu, supra note 15, at
1478; Wilmarth, supra note 73, at 343 n.536. Of course, the volatility of the underlying
asset cannot be different for different options based on the term of the option, so the
volatility smile must be a symptom of some other factor that Black-Scholes is failing to
identify; regardless, the result is that the Black-Scholes predicted price alone, absent some
modification, does not necessarily reflect actual trading prices. See generally JEAN-PIERRE
FOUQUE ET AL. DERIVATIVES IN FINANCIAL MARKETS WITH STOCHASTIC VOLATILITY
(2000).
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imperfections in the pricing mechanism of particular derivatives mar-
kets,2 13 the income tax could cause the government to bear some of these
costs; such a result would require reconsideration not only of the income
taxation of derivatives, but also the taxation of derivatives, and how they
relate to their underlying assets, more generally. For example, perhaps
the income tax law would be less concerned about the use of short-term
put options on assets than other structured derivatives since the market
seems to be able to charge a premium for such options as compared to
the price predicted by Black-Scholes, thus providing less opportunity for
such options to be used solely for tax manipulation purposes.2 14 Any
method of taxation of financial instruments that did not undertake such
an approach could provide opportunities for financial engineers inti-
mately familiar with the workings of the modern financial markets (with
the assistance of increasingly clever tax advisors) to exploit such
differences. 215
The same holds true in any area where modern risk management tech-
niques are available that differ from, or exploit vulnerabilities in, theoret-
ical models to multiply, diversify, allocate, or mitigate risk in the financial
markets. These could include, among many others, the use of profits in-
terests in partnerships as compensation, 21 6 the rise of publicly traded in-
vestment instruments such as "exchange-traded funds, '217 and the
growing influence of futures contracts on commodities prices.2t 8 As the
world begins to internalize the lessons of the most recent credit crunch, 219
the need to incorporate the risk allocation mechanisms of modern finan-
213. This could be due, for example, to unexpected jumps in the price of the underlying
asset, unanticipated volatility changes in the underlying asset, risk aversion in the behavior
of purchases, or other reasons. See, e.g., Andrea Buraschi & Jens Jackwerth, The Price of a
Smile: Hedging and Spanning in Option Markets, 14 REV. FIN. STUDIES 495, 495-96 (2001);
Sanjiv Ranjan Das & Rangarajan K. Sundaram, Of Smiles and Smirks: A Term Structure
Perspective, 34 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 211, 211 (1999); S. G. Kou, A Jump-
Diffusion Model for Option Pricing, 48 MGMT. Sci. 1086, 1086 (2002).
214. Alternatively, the premium could be thought of as a form of equity insurance,
meaning the tax law could treat such options like insurance contracts as opposed to options
priced more in accordance with Black-Scholes. Further, perhaps it would be possible to
consider the premium paid in excess of the Black-Scholes predicted price as a deductible
expense rather than as a "cost" of the option capitalized into the basis. These are not
intended to serve as actual policy proposals, but rather examples of counter-intuitive poli-
cies that could arise from taking into account the operation of imperfect financial markets.
215. See, e.g., Knoll, supra note 11, at 200 ("[F]inancially sophisticated parties reduced
their tax liabilities by using innovative financial products and techniques . .
216. See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 203, at 3-4.
217. See, e.g., Robert Hockett, Just Insurance Through Global Macro-Hedging: Infor-
mation, Distributive Equity, Efficiency, and the New Markets for Systemic-Income-Risk
Pricing and Systemic-Income-Risk-Trading in a "New Economy," 25 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON.
L. 107, 251-52 (2004); Peter N. Hall, Note, Bucking the Trend: The Unsupportability of
Index Providers' Imposition of Licensing Fees for Unlisted Trading of Exchange Traded
Funds, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1125, 1129-30 (2004).
218. See, e.g., Andrew M. Pardieck, Kegs, Crude, and Commodities Law: On Why It Is
Time to Reexamine the Suitability Doctrine, 7 NEV. L.J. 301, 302-04 (2007).
219. See, e.g., Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 1, 7 (2008); Etay Katz, The Credit Crunch: The Regulatory Way Forward, 2 LAW &
FIN. REV. 234, 234 (2008).
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cial instruments into the taxation literature becomes more pressing than
ever. Any lessons learned should then be incorporated into crafting a
more comprehensive approach to the taxation of financial instruments,
including specific investigations into the broader considerations of the
taxation of traders and dealers in such instruments and the cross-border
implications, such as changes to holding periods or characterization of
gains and losses, on a case-by-case basis.220
The closer the real world income tax can come to a normative income
tax, in part by taking into account risk allocation mechanisms and struc-
tural imperfections in modern financial markets, the more tax planning
opportunities in the real world can be minimized. In this manner, manip-
ulation of the income tax through the use of financial engineering can be
reduced, thus increasing the faith the general taxpaying public has in the
long-term viability of the income tax.221 This can be achieved not from
arguing by analogy between the real world and the normative model, but
by incorporating the lessons from the finance literature on the actual
workings of the modern financial markets into the normative taxation
models so as to more closely match the lessons that can be learned from
these models and the financial transactions in the real world. By under-
standing and anticipating financial engineering in this manner, the in-
come tax can survive even in the face of the virtually unlimited ability of
modem capital markets to exploit arbitrage opportunities.
Such an undertaking falls to the legal literature, because of the compar-
ative advantage of legal scholars to synthesize and apply the lessons
learned from other disciplines so as to craft the mechanisms and institu-
tions necessary to implement public policy.222 As the debates over taxa-
tion of risk-based returns increase, whether in the context of cross-border
capital markets, compensation of private investment funds, funding of
public corporations, or privately negotiated transactions, the lessons that
can be learned from this approach to taxation and risk become increas-
ingly relevant to the long-term viability of the income tax in light of its
perceived inability to handle the challenges of the modern financial
world.223
220. For example, it may make sense to impose a mark-to-market and blended charac-
terization regime to all derivatives traded on an exchange. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 1256
(2006).
221. See, e.g., Victor Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, 61 TAX L. REV. 89, 115-16 (2008).
222. That such an undertaking proves particularly challenging makes it more impera-
tive, not less so. See supra note 12. This has actively begun in the securities and corporate
literature. See, e.g., Decoupling I, supra note 9, at 819-20; Hu, supra note 15, at 280-83;
Huang, supra note 15, at 473-75; Stout, supra note 9, at 54-55; see also Robert J. Rhee, The
Effect of Risk on Legal Valuation, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 193, 195-96 (2007) ("[T]here is a
'remarkable gap' between scholarship in financial economics and legal bargaining. Only
recently have scholars begun to bridge this gap.").
223. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 200, at 20-22 ("[I]ncome taxation has an important
symbolic value .... It is always hard to persuade the majority to pay their taxes when it is
perceived that the wealthy minority do not pay theirs.").
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VI. CONCLUSION
This Article has begun the process of incorporating the lessons of the
income taxation and risk literature into the analysis of the income taxa-
tion of financial derivatives, including the use of financial derivatives by
financial speculators such as investment banks and hedge funds. By look-
ing at the income taxation of derivatives traded on a liquid market
through this lens, some remarkable conclusions arise. Under relatively
conservative assumptions, the analysis demonstrates that the imposition
of an income tax can result in the government effectively subsidizing cer-
tain financial speculators through the imposition of an income tax in a
world with imperfect financial markets. This occurs solely as a function
of the role of speculators in, and the risk allocation mechanisms of, mod-
ern liquid derivative markets, rather than any asymmetric or preferential
tax rule regarding the treatment of derivatives or speculators.
This Article utilizes the income taxation and risk model to uncover the
implicit efficiency and distributive costs in an income tax system with im-
perfect financial markets-costs currently missed or underappreciated-
so that such costs can be taken into account in developing a comprehen-
sive response to the taxation of financial markets. In response, this Arti-
cle proposes the adoption of a derivatives trading tax, not as a
supplement to or replacement for, but as an integral part of, the income
tax regime to offset the costs of imperfect financial markets borne by the
government through the income tax. Further, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, the approach to the taxation of risk in modern financial markets
developed in this Article may prove an integral part of a newer and more
nuanced understanding of income tax issues regarding financial markets
more generally, potentially leading to a more effective, efficient, and eq-




The following Appendix uses numerical examples to explain how the
market signal malfunction and the distributional malfunction fit within
the taxation and risk model.
PARADIGM: Absent an income tax, an investor wants to invest
$100 in a share of stock that has a 50% chance of paying $130 and a
50% chance of paying $90 in one year. Assuming the risk-free rate
of return is 4%, the $100 investment is guaranteed to return $4.
Thus, the risky portion of the investment must return $26 if the bet
wins or lose $14 if the bet loses to return the total payoff.224
The investment has a risk-adjusted present value of $6 because the in-
vestor has a 50% chance of earning $26 and a 50% chance of losing $14.
The General Equilibrium Model
The general equilibrium model of taxation and risk looks to the tax-
payer, the government, and the market.225 Based on the Kaplow model,
the starting point for an investor and the government is as follows:
(1) INVESTOR: W = y[1 + r + a(x-r)]
(2) GOV: R = To [1 + r + a(x-r)] + T1
where W is the taxpayer's wealth, y is the taxpayer's earnings in period 1,
r is the risk-free rate of return, x is the risky rate of return, a is the portion
of y the taxpayer invests in risky assets, R is total government revenue at
the end of period 1, To is government revenue as of time zero, T1 is period
1 government revenue, and a is the amount the government invests in
risky assets. 226 The model assumes that a and a represent optimal risk
exposures for the investor and the government, respectively. 227
Introducing an income tax into the Kaplow model results as follows:
(3) W = y[1 +(1-t)r + (1-t)(ax-ar)]
where t is the tax rate. Under Domar-Musgrave, in response to the impo-
sition of a tax, the taxpayer would borrow at the risk-free rate to increase
the investment in the risky asset by 1/(l-t) as follows:
(4) W = y[1 + (1-t)r + a(x-r) + rt - rt], or
224. The numbers in this example are substantially similar to those used by Weisbach,
supra note 4, partly for ease of comparison and partly for ease of calculation. See Weis-
bach, supra note 4, at 13. Regardless, the intuition provided by the simplified example is
equally supported when applied more generally. See id.
225. See Kaplow, supra note 109, at 791.
226. Id. at 790-91.
227. Id.
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(5) W = y[1 + (1-t)r + a(x-r)]
Thus, the income tax reaches only the risk-free rate of return. The re-
sult holds if either the investor can borrow at the risk-free rate to
purchase the risky asset (because rt - rt=0), or if the investor can increase
solely the risky portion of the return cost-free.
EXAMPLE 1: In light of the imposition of the tax, the investor in-
creases the investment by 200% (1/.5). The investor does so by bor-
rowing $100 at the risk-free rate and investing the additional $100 in
a second share of stock. The government wants to borrow one share
of stock and sell it for $100 so as to "short" the risk-based position.
The government can now serve as both the lender and the seller by
borrowing one share from the taxpayer, lending the taxpayer $100,
and selling the taxpayer the risky asset for the $100 loan.
In all circumstances, the taxpayer earns an $8 risk-free return on the
$200 stock investment, and pays $4 interest on the $100 loan. The $8
return is taxable at 50%, and the $4 interest payment is deductible at
50%, resulting in a net return to the taxpayer of $2 ($8*50% - $4 +
$4*50%). If the investor wins the bet, then the investor receives $52 and
owes the government $26 in taxes. In this case, the investor would re-
ceive a net return of $28. If the investor loses the bet on the risky invest-
ment, then the investor loses $28 but receives $14 from the government as
a loss deduction, with a net effect of a loss of $12. Compare this to the
no-tax world, where the investor would have received a net of $30 had
the bet won ($26 risky return plus the net $4 risk-free return), or lost a
net of $10 ($14 risky loss plus $4 risk-free return) had the bet lost. As
compared to the no-tax world, the world with an income tax in all circum-
stances results in the investor bearing a 50% tax on the initial $4 risk-free
rate of return, or $2.
At maturity, the government will receive $2 in taxes on the initial risk-
free return on the investor's stock investment of $100 ($4*50%). The
government is owed $4 in risk-free return on the loan by the investor and
owes $4 in risk-free return to the investor on the stock it sold short, net-
ting to zero. If the bet wins, the investor owes $26 in taxes, but the gov-
ernment loses $26 on its short sale, for a net of zero. If the bet loses, the
government receives $14 from the short sale, and owes the investor $14
for the tax deduction from the loss. Thus, in all circumstances, the gov-
ernment collects only $2 of taxes, or the tax on the risk-free return on the
original $100 investment. This can be demonstrated as follows:
(6) T, = [yrt-yr + yr + aytx - aytx], or




EXAMPLE 2: Assume that C is long $100 in the risky asset. In light
of the 50% tax, A wishes to double the bet in the risky asset. Rather
than engage in a circular cash flow transaction with the government,
A prefers to purchase the $100 risky asset from C, since A incurs
substantially lower transactional costs to do so. 22 8 A could purchase
the risky asset from C for $100, borrowing the $100 from C to make
the purchase from C, in much the same way as with the government
in Example 1. The interest on the loan from C to A is 8%, reflecting
both the risk-free return of 4% plus a risk-premium of 4%.
As in the case of the risk-free rate, the government remains neutral
with respect to the interest charge, because the value of the 8% deduction
to A will be exactly offset by the 8% interest income to C. As to A, the
4% risk premium represents double the borrowing cost of the risk-free
rate, resulting in A bearing double the tax liability than if A could borrow
at the risk-free rate of return.22 9 From equation (5), this can be repre-
sented as:
(8) W=y[1 + (1-t)r + a(x-r) + rt - bt]
where b is the investor's borrowing rate. This result, arising due to the
cost of borrowing, is where the derivative market becomes attractive as
an alternative.
Derivatives as Coin Flips
EXAMPLE 3: Assume an investor A wishes to make a $100 invest-
ment in the risky asset absent taxes. The government imposes a 50%
tax. To mitigate the tax, A must double the size of the investment.
Due to transaction costs and borrowing costs, A desires to double
the size of the investment by purchasing a derivative long in the in-
vestment for $100, rather than borrowing $100 and investing the ad-
ditional $100 in the risky asset. Because of the offsetting obligations
of the derivative, no upfront cash payment is required. The
counterparty to the derivative contract is B, whose borrowing rate is
the risk-free rate.
For B to accept the short position in the derivative, B must hedge the
short risk position by purchasing the asset long, which leads to an in-
creased price for the asset as compared to the price prior to the introduc-
228. If both A and C wish to mitigate the tax through doubling their investment, each
could engage in a transaction substantially similar to that in Example 1, with the effect of
mitigating the tax on the risky element, the government having zero exposure to the risky
asset, and a net tax of fifty percent on the risk-free return on the risky assets of both A and
C. If transaction costs are involved, however, this may not be a realistic alternative as each
would have to engage in identical transactions with the government rather than deal once
with each other.
229. See Cunningham, supra note 92, at 37-39 for an example.
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tion of the income tax. This increase in price serves as a signal to the
government that it must have accepted some net portion of the exposure
to the risky asset in imposing the tax. To mitigate this risk, the govern-
ment borrows the risky asset from A and sells it short to B, using the
proceeds to finance a risk-free loan to B. B uses the loan to purchase the
asset. The government will have fully mitigated its implicit risk position
imposed through the income tax and will have satisfied the market de-
mand for the asset by doubling the supply of the asset through a short
sale in response to the doubling of the demand for the asset by B. This
can represented as:
(9) W=y[1 + (1-t)r + (1-t)(ax-ar) + tx]
Unlike in (5), under (9), by permitting the investor to increase the bet
without an initial outlay of cash, the derivative mitigates the tax on the
entire return on the risky asset, including the initial risk-free return. This
is not realistic, since B incurred the risk-free rate to hedge and thus would
have passed this cost on to A as part of the transaction, but it serves a
useful illustrative function. 230
Under this scenario, if A wins the bet, then A wins $60, and pays $30 to
the government in taxes. The government loses $30 on the short, and has
a net of zero on the risky portion of the investment. B wins $30 from the
government, and loses $30 to A, for a net of zero on the risky portion.
Thus, none of the return is taxed under the Domar-Musgrave theorem,
the government remains indifferent, and the market price returns to
equilibrium.
Market Signal Malfunction
EXAMPLE 4: In addition to the facts in Example 2, assume that A,
instead of purchasing the $100 risky asset from C, prefers to double
the risky bet through the use of a derivative with C, and they enter
into a $100 derivative contract with respect to the risky asset.
With respect to A and C, the results are substantially similar to those
described above. The two primary differences are: (1) A does not incur
any up-front borrowing costs, and (2) A now holds two distinct risky as-
sets, the initial risky investment and a derivative on the initial risky in-
vestment. This can be represented as:
230. In reality, B would have required A to pay the spot price of the asset plus time
value for the derivative, but simplifying the numbers does not impact the analysis and has
been used in the literature to similar effect. See David M. Schizer, Executives and Hedg-
ing: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 440, 490
n.202 (2002) ("Although I use $900,000 in the text for the sake of simplicity, the price
should be higher because forward prices generally equal the spot price plus an amount
based on time value."). Such additional costs act in much the same manner as borrowing
costs or other transaction costs, and thus cause distributive concerns, but can be disre-




(10) W=y[1 + (1-t)r + (1-t)(ax-ar) + txd]
where d is the risk that the counterparty will not default if x>0, and d is 1
when x<O.
In the case of A entering into a derivative with a hedging investor such
as C, the derivative investment substantially replicates owning the under-
lying risky asset, since payment on the derivative will always be satisfied
out of C's investment. Thus, d is equal to 1 in all circumstances, resulting
in a return to Equation (9). Similarly, to the extent A quantifies d and
discounts the price of the derivative accordingly, the formula also returns
to Equation (9).
The analysis with respect to the government changes slightly. If A wins
the bet, then A wins $52 and pays $26 to the government. C loses and
pays $26 to A but wins $26 on the underlying asset, for a net of zero. The
government earns $26 in tax, effectively enjoying 50% of the initial risky
assets in the market (that is, both A's and C's initial investment). Simi-
larly, if A loses the bet, then A loses $28, and receives $14 from the gov-
ernment, while C continues to net to zero. The government has a net loss
of $14, effectively bearing 50% of the initial risky assets in the market
(both A's and C's). Thus, although A effectively mitigated the tax, the
government did not return to equilibrium. From equation (6), this can be
represented as:
(11) T, = yrt + aytx-aytxm
where m is the extent of the market signal and 0_m 1. If m=1, then
Equation (11) equals Equation (7), and the government collects tax on
the risk-free return only. If m<1, the government's exposure to x is
greater than a, a suboptimal result.
Market Signal and Distributional Malfunction
EXAMPLE 5: Assume that A wishes to double the bet in the risky
investment due to the imposition of the income tax, and seeks to use
the derivatives market to reduce the transaction and borrowing costs
of doing so. Rather than enter into a derivative with B (a market
maker) or C (a hedger), A enters into the derivative with D, a
speculator.
D, acting as a pure speculator, has no assets or income with which to
pay the derivative if it loses; rather, D is gambling that the derivative will
win. As a result, A no longer holds two identical risky investments. In-
stead, A owns $100 of the initial risky investment plus a derivative on the
risky investment that is subject to D's default risk. Under this scenario, if
A loses, then A loses $28 and receives $14 from the government, while D
wins $14 and owes $7 to the government, for a net loss of $14 to A and $7
to the government. If A wins then, as before, A wins $26 on the underly-
ing risky asset and is owed $26 on the derivative. The difference is that A
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does not receive the $26 from D, since D has no assets with which to pay.
Thus, A receives only $26 pre-tax, and pays $13 to the government, for a
net gain of $13 to A. D defaults, and thus does not make any payment to
A, but also does not receive any payment from the government. As in
equation (10), this can be represented as:
(12) W=y[1 + (1-t)r + (1-t)(ax-ar) + txd]
but where d=0 when x>0. The value of d establishes the extent to which
the investor successfully mitigates the tax, at least on a risk-adjusted pre-
sent value basis. To the extent d could be priced, this would not be prob-
lematic. Default risk is difficult to accurately price,231 however, and in
liquid derivatives markets, d is structurally not completely priced.232
With respect to the government, assuming A wins the bet, A wins $52,
and pays $26 to the government, while D loses $26, and receives $13 from
the government. Conversely, if A loses the bet, then A loses $28 and is
owed $14 by the government, and D wins $14 and owes $7 to the govern-
ment. Because the counterparty D is a pure speculator, there is no in-
creased demand in the market, and thus the market signal malfunction
remains.233 Thus, the government will continue to bear the risk of a $100
investment in the risky asset through the imposition of the income tax,
since it will win $13 or lose $7 in all circumstances.
The net result for the government is to bear half of the risk on the
initial investment in the risky asset due to the market signal malfunc-
tion-the same result as if A had not entered into any Domar-Musgrave
transaction. Rather than result in a circular cash flow, in which both A
and the government either win $13 or lose $7, respectively, as partners in
the risky investment, by imposing the income tax, the government effec-
tively transfers $7 of value from A to D. This has a positive risk-adjusted
present value to D, as compared to the pre-tax world.
The identical result can be demonstrated through a slightly modified
version of the example described above.
EXAMPLE 6: Assume A doubles the $100 bet in the risky invest-
ment through a derivative with C (a hedging investor), and as a re-
sult, the government continues to bear half of the investment risk on
both A's and C's initial risky investment. For simplicity, assume no
market signal malfunction, but assume transaction costs which pre-
vent circular transactions between the government and either A or
C. The government thus enters into a $200 short position in the risky
asset through a derivative with E, a pure gambling speculator.
231. See Jarrow & Turnbull, supra note 29, at 53-54; Herb Johnson & Ren6 Stulz, The
Pricing of Options with Default Risk, 42 J. FIN. 267, 267 (1987).
232. See Mozumdar, supra note 33, at 222.
233. Of course, to the extent that D hedged, the market signal would return.
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If the government loses on the derivative, it owes a net $26 to E, which
is offset by the $26 long exposure it has in the initial risky assets through
the imposition of the income tax, and thus the government has a net of
zero. If the government wins on the derivative and E pays, then the gov-
ernment wins a net of $14 from E and loses on its long exposure in the
initial risky assets through the imposition of the income tax, also resulting
in a net of zero. If the government wins on the derivative and E defaults,
however, the government receives nothing from E, but it continues to
bear the loss from its exposure to the initial risky assets through the im-
position of the income tax, resulting in a net loss of $14. This can be
represented as:
(13) INVESTOR: W=y[1 + (1-t)r + (1-t)(ax-ar) + txdc]
(14) GOV: T, = yrt + aytx - aytxdE
where dc is the default risk of C and dE is the default risk of E. Genera-
lizing and combining with equation (11) results in:
(15) GOV: T1 = yrt + aytx - aytxdm
such that if m=1 and d=1, the government returns to Equation (7), but if
either m<1 or d<1, or both, the government bears sub-optimal exposure
to x.
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